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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:
THE UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT'
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration as a forum for dispute resolution has been a part of the American
common law heritage for at least the past one hundred fifty years. However, until
recently, state law was almost uniformly biased against arbitration.2 The theory
at common law was that either party to an agreement to arbitrate future disputes
could void the agreement at any time.3 This legal environment rendered the
institution of arbitration impotent in any situation in which one of the parties
decided that their interests would be better served if the dispute was resolved in
a more traditional court setting.
As a response to the weak condition of state arbitration law, the Uniform
Arbitration Act (hereinafter "U.A.A.") was proposed by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1955.' At present, approximately
thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have adopted arbitration statutes
patterned after the U.A.A.5 The cumulative effect of the proposal of the U.A.A.,
its subsequent enactment by two-thirds of the state legislatures, and the passage
of the similar Federal Arbitration Act (hereinafter "F.A.A.") signaled the evolution
of arbitration law in this country toward the favored status that the arbitration
process now enjoys.
In 1984, contemporaneously with the creation of the Center for the Study of
Dispute Resolution at the University of Missouri-Columbia, the first issue of the
Missouri Journal of Dispute Resolution was published. This first publication
contained an article entitled Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act.
Since that time, every subsequent issue of this publication has included a detailed
update of that original article which monitored the evolution of arbitration law
among U.A.A. jurisdictions.
The purposes of this annual Article are to provide a survey of recent
developments in the case law interpreting and applying the various state versions
of the U.A.A.; to develop and explain the underlying principles and rationales that
1. This project was written and prepared by Journal of Dispute Resolution Members and
Candidates under the direction of Associate Editor in Chief Joseph E. Maxwell and Note and Comment
Editor Robert K. Angstead.
2. Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, 71 A.B.A.J. 78 (1985).
3. Id. at 79.
4. UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 4 (1978) [hereinafter U.A.A.].
5. Jurisdictions which have adopted arbitration statutes patterned after the U.A.A. are Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.
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courts have applied in particular cases; and to promote uniformity in the
interpretation of the U.A.A. by providing courts and practitioners with a
framework for analyzing similar cases.6
II. VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The U.A.A. provides that a written agreement to submit to arbitration "is
valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of a contract."7 While most states try to promote the
settlement of disputes through arbitration, the courts have found arbitration
agreements to be invalid for various reasons.
A. Piecemeal Resolution
One argument that parties often use to avoid arbitration is that it will result
in piecemeal resolution of the dispute.8 In Joba Construction v. Monroe County
Drain Commissioner,9 Joba had a contract containing an arbitration agreement
with Monroe County to construct a water pollution control facility.' ° Monroe
County Drain Commission became dissatisfied with Joba's work and issued a stop
order." Joba filed for arbitration pursuant to the contract and, in addition, sued
the commissioner in circuit court requesting the same relief as requested in the
arbitration claim. 2 The commissioner and the county filed a counterclaim
against Joba, alleging abuse of process.' The county also sued the surety on a
6. See Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1989 J. DISP. RESOL 237 (hereinafter
Recent Developments 1989); Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1988 J. DisP. RESOL.
247 (hereinafterRecentDevelopments 1988); Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1987
Mo. J. Disp. RESoL 177 (hereinafter Recent Developments 1987); Recent Developments: The Uniform
Arbitration Act, 1986 Mo. J. Disp. RESOL. 169 (hereinafter Recent Developments 1986); Recent
Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1985 Mo. J. Disp. RESOL 173 (hereinafter Recent
Developments 1985); Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1984 Mo. J. Disp. RESOL
207 (hereinafter Recent Developments 1984); Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 48
Mo. L REV. 137 (1983) (hereinafter Recent Developments 1983). Recent Developments 1989 collected
cases decided between September 1987, and September 1988. Recent Developments 1988 collected
cases decided between September 1986, and September 1987. Recent Developments 1987 collected
cases decided between September 1985, and September 1986. Recent Developments 1986 collected
cases decided between September 1984, and September 1985. Recent Developments 1985 collected
cases decided between September 1983, and September 1984. Recent Developments 1984 collected
cases decided between September 1982, and September 1983. Recent Developments 1983 collected
cases decided before September 1982. This Article surveys these previous cases and cases decided
between September 1988, and September, 1989.
7. U.AA. § 1.
8. See Baldwin Co. v. Weyland Mach. Shop Inc., 685 S.W.2d 537 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985).
9. 150 Mich. App. 173, 388 N.W.2d 251 (1986).
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UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
performance bond, and the surety filed a third party complaint against Joba
seeking indemnification.14 The action on the performance bond was consolidated
with Joba's suit, and Monroe county was added as a defendant in Joba's action."
The court stated the abuse of process claim and the action on the performance
bond were not subject to arbitration because this would result in repetition of
evidence and presentations to the arbitrator and the court, which is inconsistent
with arbitration's objective of providing inexpensive and expeditious disposition
of disputes.16 Therefore, the court held that the principle of judicial economy
prohibited arbitration.
17
In contrast, the court in Steinberg/W.F.L Foods Inc. v. D.C.M. and
Associates," rejected the piecemeal argument and held that the conflict was
suitable for arbitration.' 9 The court held that to allow parties to avoid arbitration
by joining as defendants in its lawsuit parties which are not bound by the
arbitration agreement would be inconsistent with the intent of the arbitration
act.20
B. Application of Contract Principles
The U.A.A. provides that an arbitration agreement is valid unless grounds
exist at law or in equity for revocation of a contract. 2' As a result, courts apply
contract principles to determine the validity of an arbitration agreement.
1. The Writing Requirement
The U.A.A. requires that an arbitration agreement be in writing.22 The
Missouri version of the U.A.A. requires any contract containing an arbitration
clause to give notice of the clause to the parties in ten-point capital letters.' In
Hefele v. Catanzaro, the court ruled an arbitration clause was unenforceable
14. Id.
15. Id. at , 388 N.W.2d at 253.
16. Id. at __, 388 N.W.2d at 254.
17. Id.
18. 522 So. 2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
19. Id. at 513. See also Forest City Dillon, Inc. v. Superior Court for Pima, 138 Ariz. 410, 675
P.2d 297 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Steinberg v. Prudential-Bache Sec., No. 8173 Slip Op. (Del. 1985);
Landmark Properties, Inc. v. Architects Int'l, 172 Il. App. 3d 379, 526 N.E.2d 603 (1988); J & K
Cement Constr. Inc. v. Montalbano Builders, Inc., 119 Il1. App. 3d 663, 456 N.E.2d 889 (1983).
20. Steinberg, 522 So. 2d at 513.
21. U.A.A. § 1.
22. Id.
23. Mo. REV. STAT. § 435.460 (1986).
24. 727 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
1990]
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because the parties had failed to include the required notice.' The court, while
recognizing the harshness of this rule, noted the legislative concern that entry into
such agreements be voluntary.26
The courts have upheld arbitration agreements that were not in writing in rare
instances.27  In Landmark Properties Inc. v. Architects International," an
Illinois appellate court was faced with this matter. In Landmark, the plaintiff
entered into an agreement with an architectural firm.29 Included in the agreement
was a provision requiring arbitration of any dispute.30 The defendant performed
the services for the plaintiff, although the plaintiff never signed the agreement.3"
The plaintiff did not pay for the services, and the defendant filed a demand for
arbitration. 2 Although the plaintiff did not dispute the existence of an oral
agreement, it argued it was not bound by the arbitration clause in the written
agreement.33 On appeal the Illinois court ruled that the parties' conduct related
to the written contract and not the oral agreement; therefore, the dispute was to be
settled by an arbitrator.' While the U.A.A. clearly requires a writing in Section
1, this court apparently equates conduct related to a written agreement as within
the writing requirement.
2. Fraudulent Inducement
Parties commonly use theories of fraud and misrepresentation to argue that
arbitration agreements are invalid.35 However, while both contract law and the
25. Id. at 477. See aLso Lake Plumbing v. Seabreeze Constr. Corp., 493 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986) (if there is no issue as to making of agreement which contains an arbitration clause it
is an error for trial court to deny party the right to arbitrate and require the dispute to be litigated in
court); Wigod v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 141 IlL. App. 3d 129, 490 N.E.2d 39 (1986) (bylaws may
constitute a sufficient writing to satisfy Illinois Arbitration Act); McKinstry v. Valley Obstetrics-
Gynecology Clinic, P.C., 428 Mich. 167, 405 N.W.2d 88 (1987) (statutory presumption of validity
accrues once evidence of agreement is satisfactorily established); Cf Saltner v. Farrier, 653 P.2d 413
(Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Zac Smith & Co. v. Moonspinner Condominium Ass'n, 472 So. 2d 1324 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (arbitration clause of contract was binding on third party beneficiary); Board of
County Comm'rs v. Cam Constr. Co., 300 Md. 643, 480 A.2d 795 (1984) (general contractor was
allowed to bring subcontractor's claims under arbitration clause); Computer Corp. of Am. v. Zarecor,
16 Mass. App. Ct. 456, 452 N.E.2d 267 (1983); Cooke County Bd. of Highway Comm'rs v. Newport
Utils. Bd., 690 S.W.2d 231 (Tenn. 1985) (indemnification clause prevails over arbitration clause).
26. Hefele, 727 S.W.2d at 477.
27. See Hot Springs County School Dist. v. Strube Constr. Co., 715 P.2d 540 (Wyo. 1986).
28. 172 nIl. App. 3d 379, 526 N.E.2d 603 (1988).
29. 111 at 380, 526 N.E.2d at 604.
30. Id
31. Id.
32. Id. at 381, 526 N.E.2d at 605.
33. Id. at 382, 526 N.E.2d at 605.
34. Id. at 384, 526 N.E.2d at 606.
35. See Himmelstein v. Valenti Dev. Corp., 103 IMl. App. 3d 911, 431 N.E.2d 1299 (IMI. App. Ct.
1982); Paramore v. Inter-Regional Fin. Group Leasing Co., 68 N.C. App. 659, 316 S.E.2d 90 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1984).
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U.A.A. provide that fraud and misrepresentation serve to invalidate an agreement,
fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract does not necessarily invalidate an
arbitration clause within that contract. s6
In the case of Michael-Curry Cos. Inc. v. Knutson Shareholders Liquidating
Trust,37 the defendant, Knutson, claimed fraud in the inducement, and therefore,
that no valid arbitration agreement existed.3s The Minnesota Supreme Court
ruled, however, that the issue of fraud in the inducement was an issue for the
arbitrator 9.3  The court stated that, when an arbitration agreement specifically
shows that the parties intend to arbitrate fraud in the inducement, or the arbitration
clause was sufficiently broad to comprehend the issue, then fraud in the
inducement must go to the arbitrator.' The court felt that by sending cases such
as this to arbitration it was promoting the policy of the Minnesota U.A.A., which
favors arbitration1
3. Rescission
Rescission of a contract is another method parties have used to attack
arbitration agreements. 2 In Coughlan Construction Co. v. Town of Rockport,43
the parties entered into a construction contract which contained an arbitration
provision." A dispute arose after work had begun and Coughlan, the contractor,
filed a demand for arbitration. 45 After this demand, but prior to the beginning
of arbitration proceedings, Coughlan notified Rockport that it was forced to stop
work, and the contract was abandoned. 4" Rockport filed a complaint in superior
court requesting a stay of arbitration on the ground that the parties had abandoned
the arbitration agreement when they abandoned the contract. 7 The court ordered
the parties to proceed to arbitration of claims Coughlan made before the contract
36. See Grane v. Grane, 143 IM. App. 3d 979, 493 N.E.2d 1112 (In. Ct. App. 1986); Wetzel v.
Covement Oil Corp., 733.P.2d 424 (Okla. Ci. App. 1986).
37. 449 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1989).
38. Id. at 140.
39. Id. at 142.
40. Id. at 141.
41. Id at 142.
42. See Willis Flooring, Inc. v. Howard S. Lease Constr. Co., 656 P.2d 1184 (Alaska 1983)
(contract was attacked because of lack of mutuality); U.S. Insulation Inc. v. Hilro Constr. Co., 146
Ariz. 250, 705 P.2d 490 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 565 A.2d
908 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989); Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974
(Idaho 1987) (arbitration agreement attacked on grounds of lack of mutual assent); Fraternal Order of
Police v. Washington Park, 123 IM. App. 3d 26, 462 N.E.2d 855 (1984); McCrary Eng'g Corp. v.
Upland, 472 N.E.2d 1305 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Wamego v. L R. Foy Constr. Co., 9 Kan. App. 2d
168, 675 P.2d 912 (1984).
43. 23 Mass. App. C. 994, 505 N.E.2d 203 (1987).
44. Id. at , 505 N.E.2d at 204.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at __, 505 N.E.2d at 205.
1990]
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was abandoned." Coughlan won in arbitration and Rockport tried unsuccessfully
to have the award vacated.49
The appellate court found no indication that Coughlan had agreed to a
rescission of the contract because it was forced to stop work.50 Therefore, the
court held that the arbitration provisions were in effect at the time Rockport was
ordered to proceed to arbitration.5' The court placed particular emphasis on the
facts that there was no request for contract rescission, the dispute arose prior to
abandonment of the contract, and the party seeking arbitration persisted in
pursuing arbitration after the contract was abandoned.52
C. Statutory Construction
Generally, state courts have chosen to construe arbitration statutes broadly to
promote a policy of enforcing arbitration agreements." However, in National
Education Association v. United School District,54 a Kansas court ignored this
principle. The plaintiff, a teacher, sought confirmation of an arbitration award
relating to his contract with the school district." The court held that the Kansas
version of the U.A.A. did not apply to the plaintiff's employment contract because
the statute was "plain and unambiguous" in its exclusion of all employment
contracts, regardless of whether the employer was in the private or public
sector.5 6
D. Time Limits on Raising the Invalidity Defense
Another consideration affecting the validity of an arbitration agreement is
whether there are any time limitations placed on raising the invalidity defense.
This issue arose in' Arrow Overall Supply Co. v. Peloquin Enters.,57 where the
plaintiff sought to have the arbitrator's award confirmed in a judicial proceeding.
The defendant did not appear at the prior arbitration proceeding, although he






53. See Howard County Bd. of Educ. v. Howard County Educ. Ass'n., 61 Md. App. 631, 487
A.2d 1220 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985), cert. granted, 306 Md. 47, 506 A.2d 1190 (1986); Wilson v.
McGrow, Pridgeen & Co., 298 Md. 66, 467 A.2d 1025 (Md. 1983); Forest Hills v. Weber Inc., 691
S.W.2d 361, (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); State ex rel. Tri-City Constr. Co. v. Marsh, 668 S.W.2d 148 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1984).
54. 7 Kan. App. 2d 529, 644 P.2d 1006 (Kan. App. C. 1982).
55. Id. at __,644 P.2d at 1007.
56. Id. at _, 644 P.2d at 1009.
57. 414 Mich. 95, 323 N.E.2d 1 (1982).
58. Id. at 101, 323 N.E.2d at 3.
[Vol. 1990, No. 2
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defendant challenged the validity of the agreement for the first time at the
confirmation proceedings. 9 The Michigan Supreme Court held that the defense
was timely; however, the court added that a party who participates in the
arbitration proceeding cannot challenge the validity of the agreement at the
confirmation hearing.6 The court felt that if a party chooses not to participate
in the arbitration process he or she should not be required to seek an injunction
to stay the arbitration proceeding in order to preserve the invalidity defense.61
The receipt of a notice letter imposes no duty on one not bound by an arbitration
agreement. 62 As long as the party does not participate, the defense may be
timely raised in the later confirmation proceedings.
E. Statutory Causes of Action Favoring Litigation
Some arbitration agreements may be unenforceable due to a state policy
favoring litigation of certain statutory causes of action.61 In Blow v. Shaugnes-
sy,6 the North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that securities trading
litigation should not be stayed pending arbitration even though there was an
arbitration clause in the securities agreement between the parties.s A factor in
the court's ruling was a pending Securities and Exchange Commission regulation
stating that any securities broker who entered into an agreement binding the
customer to arbitration involving disputes arising under federal securities laws had
committed a fraudulent, manipulative, or deceptive act.6 The court stated that
although North Carolina law approves of arbitration as a manner of settling




61. lId at 100, 323 N.E.2d at 3.
62. Id.
63. See Sabates v. Int'l Medical Centers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Hannen
v. Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc., 385 Mass. 813, 434 N.E.2d 611 (Mass. 1982); Cf Obstetrics
and Gynecologists v. Pepper, 101 Nev. 105, 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1985) (arbitration agreement found
invalid because one of parties was member of protected class).
64. 68 N.C. App. 1, 313 S.E.2d 868 (1984).
65. Id. at 22, 313 S.E.2d at 874.
66. Id. at 15, 313 S.E.2d at 876.
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1.567.20 (1983).
68. Blow, 68 N.C. App. at ___, 313 S.E.2d at 876. The court indicated that the securities act was
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F. Role of Federal Arbitration Act
An agreement which is unenforceable under state law may be revived under
the F.A.A.. 9 In Old Dominion Insurance Co. v. Dependable Reinsurance Co.,"°
the court compelled arbitration despite the fact that the arbitration clause was
unenforceable under the Florida Arbitration Act. 7' The arbitration clause was
unenforceable because a "retrocession contract" between the parties contained a
provision allowing for removal of the arbitration to Bermuda. 72 However, the
court found the arbitration was enforceable under the F.A.A., which provides for
arbitration where the contractual relations between the two parties involve
interstate commerce.7 3 The court also demonstrated the effect of this presump-
tion favoring arbitration in its treatment of a clause elsewhere in the contract
providing for service of suit. The court held that doubts concerning provisions
apparently incompatible with the arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of
arbitration.74
III. WAIVER
A. Right to Compel Arbitration
1. Repudiation of the Underlying Agreement
In City of Wamego v. L. R. Foy Construction Co.,7" the Kansas Court of
Appeals held that repudiation of a contract containing an arbitration provision acts
as a waiver of the right to arbitrate.76 Wamego sued Foy for breach of contract
after Foy denied that a contract existed between the two parties. 7' Foy moved
to stay the suit and compel arbitration. 78 The court held that the arbitration
provision could not be held a separate agreement absent evidence of an indepen-
dent meeting of the minds regarding arbitration. 79 The court noted that Foy did
not limit its repudiation of the contract and held that the repudiation constituted
conduct "inconsistent with a continued right to compel arbitration."
69. See Preziose v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., No. 897-298 (Vt. Oct. 13, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file).
70. 472 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985).
71. Id. at 1367.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1368.
75. 9 Kan. App. 2d 168, 675 P.2d 912 (1984).
76. Id. at 172, 675 P.2d at 916.
77. Id. at 171, 675 P.2d at 915.
78. Id. at 169, 675 P.2d at 913.
79. Id. at 172, 675 P.2d at 916.
80. Id. at 173, 675 P.2d at 917.
[Vol. 1990, No. 2
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However, in U.S. Insulation, Inc. v. Hilro Construction Co.,"' the Arizona
Supreme Court held that Hilro did not waive its right to compel arbitration when
it repudiated other obligations under the contract.82 In U.S. Insulation, Hilro
gave U.S. Insulation (USI) written notice that it considered the contract to be "no
longer in effect., 8 3 USI filed suit and Hilro moved to stay proceedings and to
compel arbitration pursuant to the contract. USI claimed that Hilro waived its
right to compel arbitration when it repudiated the contract. The court held that
while repudiation of the arbitration clause itself, or a claim that the contract was
void ab initio, would waive the right to arbitrate, repudiation of any other
obligation under the contract would not."'
In Gilmore v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.," a New York federal
district court stated that a waiver of the right to compel arbitration may be
retracted when the waiver is based on a repudiation of the arbitration agree-
ment." The court concluded that a party must show an "amended complaint
changed the scope or theory of the previous claims to nullify the earlier waiver
and to revive the right to compel arbitration." ' Gilmore's complaint alleged a
violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, breach of
fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and common law fraud.aa Gilmore later
amended his complaint to include a RICO violation.89 Prior to the RICO claim
Shearson waived its right to compel arbitration; after the RICO claim Shearson
wanted those rights reinstated.90
The district court found that "the addition of the RICO claim certainly
add[ed] a new 'theory' to the plaintiff's case."91 Before amending the complaint
Shearson made a business determination to forego its right to arbitration of the
common law claims because the Section 10(b) claim was ruled non-arbitrable. 92
In the interim the United States Supreme Court ruled that both RICO and Section
10(b) claims were arbitrable. 93 The district court said that because the "founda-
tion of that decision (Shearson's) was eroded by plaintiff's successful motion to
amend the complaint and by an intervening change in law," then, "in fairness,
Shearson should be able to revive its right to move to compel arbitration of the
81. 146 Ariz. 250, 705 P.2d 490 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 258, 705 P.2d at 498.
84. Id.
85. 668 F. Supp. 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
86. Id. See also Peterson v. Shearson/American Express, 849 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1988).
87. Gilmore, 668 F. Supp. at 316.
88. Id. at 315.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 317.
92. Id. at 318.
93. Id. at 316. The Supreme Court decided this issue in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220 (1987).
1990]
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§10(b) claims."9 The court ruled on the common law claim that Shearson's
original waiver was enforceable because the addition of the RICO claim did not
sufficiently "erode" the decision to litigate those claims.95
2. Failure to Make a Timely Assertion
In Falcon Steel Co. v. Weber Engineering Co.,9 the Delaware Court of
Chancery applied three principles to the issue of waiver. First, any doubts as to
arbitrability must be resolved in favor of arbitration.97 Second, to waive the right
to compel arbitration, a party must have taken action inconsistent with that
right.9" Third, laches or equitable estoppel will bar arbitration through waiver
only when arbitration would not be equitable, such as where the opposing side has
lost relevant evidence due to the delay.99  The court held that where the
defendant could not produce evidence that the plaintiff's delay had caused the
defendant to lose its claim against the plaintiff, no waiver had occurred.'0°
Stauffer Construction Co. v. Board of Education'°  involved a contract for
the renovation of a school. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that
Stauffer could waive its right to compel arbitration by waiting too long to file its
demand. The court also recognized the possibility that a party could waive its
right to arbitration by filing a lawsuit against the opposing party.'0 2
In U.S. Insulation v. Hilro Construction Co.,1 °3 the Arizona Court of
Appeals held that a party which had no obligation to seek arbitration could not be
held to have waived the right to compel arbitration due to delay.1° 4 Similarly,
in Kostakos v. KSN Joint Venture No. 1,"05 the Illinois Appellate Court held that
when both plaintiff and defendant have been dilatory, and the delay did not
prejudice the plaintiff, defendant's delay did not result in a waiver of the right to
compel arbitration.1°6
94. Gilmore, 668 F. Supp. at 318.
95. Id. at 319.
96. 517 A.2d 281 (Del. Ch. 1986).
97. Id. at 287.
98. Id. at 288.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 54 Md. App. 658, 460 A.2d 609 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983).
102. Id. But see D.E. Wright Elec. v. Henry Ross Const., 183 IUI. App. 3d 46, 538 N.F.2d 1182
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
103. 146 Ariz. 250, 705 P.2d 490 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1985).
104. Id. See also Gold Coast Mall v. Larmar Corp., 298 Md. 96, 468 A.2d 91 (1983); Cameron
v. Griffith, 91 N.C. App. 164, 370 S.E.2d 704 (1988).
105. 142 I. App. 3d 533, 491 N.E.2d 1322 (1986).
106. Id. at 536, 491 N.E2d at 1325.
[Vol. 1990, No. 2
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3. Participation in Litigation
In D.E. Wright Electric v. Henry Ross Construction,'07 the Illinois Appel-
late Court stated that "while it has been held that submitting arbitrable issues to
a court of law, as by filing a counterclaim, may result in the waiver of the right
to arbitration, the filing of a counterclaim and answer does not automatically result
in waiver of arbitration rights."1'8 In holding that the defendant did not waive
its right to compel arbitration, the court noted that the defendant had asserted its
right to arbitration early in the proceeding but was denied.' 9
In TDE v. Israel,"' another Illinois appellate court stated that "waiver of
a contractual right to arbitration occurs when a party's conduct is so inconsistent
with the arbitration clause as to demonstrate an abandonment of that right." '
In Preferred Financial Corp. v. Quality Homes, Inc.,"' the Minnesota Court of
Appeals reached that result where there had been a trial on the merits." 3 The
court held that an issuer of bonds waived its right to compel arbitration by failing
to move to compel arbitration until after a trial on the merits."" The court
stated that the bond issuer displayed no intent to seek arbitration by instead
choosing to rely on a summary judgment motion." 5
Similarly, in Capital Mortgage Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand,"6 the Michigan
Court of Appeals found a waiver of the right to compel arbitration where summary
judgment was granted against a party who then sought to compel arbitration.'
In Servomation Corp. v. Henry Construction Co.," 8 the North Carolina
Court of Appeals found a waiver of the right to compel arbitration where the
defendant served numerous interrogatories (which the plaintiff answered) and filed
a motion for summary judgment, alternatively requesting an order to compel
107. 183 I1. App. 3d 46, 538 N.E.2d 1182 (1. App. Ct. 1989).
108. Id. at 53, 538 N.E.2d at 1187.
109. Id. at 53-54, 538 N.E.2d at 1187-88.
110. 185 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 541 N.E.2d 1281 (Il1. App. Ct. 1989).
111. Id. at -, 541 N.E.2d at 1286. See aLso Post Tensioned Eng'g Corp. v. Fairway Plaza
Assocs., 412 So. 2d 871,874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982),petition denied, 419 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1982),
appealfiled, 429 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. Dist. Cf. App. 1983).
112. 439 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 744. See also Hanslin Builders, Inc. v. Britt Dev. Corp., 15 Mass. App. Ct. 319, 445
N.E.2d 188 (1983), cert denied, 388 Mass. 1105, 448 N.E.2d 766; Rustad v. Rustad, 68 N.C. App.
58, 314 S.E.2d 275 (1984), cert. denied, 311 N.C. 763, 321 S.E.2d 145. But see Forest City Dillon,
Inc. v. Superior Court for Pima, 138 Ariz. 410, 675 P.2d 297 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
115. Preferred Financial, 439 N.W.2d at 744. See also Kayne v. Payne Webber, Inc., 684 F.
Supp. 978 (N.D. I11. 988).
116. 142 Mich. App. 531, 369 N.W.2d 922 (1985).
117. Id.
118. 70 N.C. App. 309,318 S.E.2d 904 (1984), aff'd after remand, 74 N.C. App. 603, 328 S.E.2d
842 (1985), rev'd, 316 N.C. 543, 342 S.E.2d 853 (1986).
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arbitration.11 9 The court reasoned that public policy favored waiver where
extensive discovery resulted in "manifest detriment" to the opposing party.
12 0
However, in Servomation Corp. v. Hickory Construction Co.,"' the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that the mere filing of a complaint does not result
in waiver, absent evidence of prejudice to the opposing party."z The court
stated that evidence of prejudice could include being forced to bear the expense
of a long trial, losing helpful evidence, taking steps in litigation to the party's
detriment, or making available to the opponent the use of judicial discovery
procedures not available in arbitration.)2 Similarly, in County of Clark v.
Blanchard Construction Co., 2 4 the Nevada Supreme Court held that participation
in litigation constitutes waiver only if it prejudices the other party.' 25
Some courts have focused on the expenditure of judicial resources to
determine whether waiver has occurred. In Home Gas Corp. v. Walter's of
Hadley,126 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the defendant's failure
to demand arbitration before allowing the parties and the court to expend "a great
deal of time, expense, and resources on trying the case" resulted in a waiver of the
defendant's right to later compel arbitration. 27
Other decisions have emphasized the parties' intent. In District Moving &
Storage Co. v. Gardiner & Gardiner," a Maryland appellate court held that
"waiver of the right to arbitrate cannot be inferred in the absence of a clear
expression of intent."'" Thus, where the defendant's actions consisted of (1)
filing demurrers to plaintiff's declaration, amended declaration, and second
declaration; (2) submitting memoranda in support of its demurrer to the first
119. Id.
120. Id. at 312, 318 S.E.2d at 906. See also Norden v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 739 P.2d 914 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1987); Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974 (Idaho 1987);
Joba Construction v. Monroe County Drain Comm'r, 150 Mich. App. 173, 388 N.W.2d 251 (1986).
But see County of Hennepin v. Ada-Bec Sys., 394 N.W.2d 611 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (participation
was consistent with the flexibility of the arbitration process); Kostakos v. KSN Joint Venture No. 1,
142 IM. App. 3d 533, 491 N.E.2d 1322 (1986) (waiver is to be determined by the issues submitted to
litigation, not by the number of papers filed in court).
121. 316 N.C. 543, 342 S.E.2d 853 (1986).
122. Id. See also Burd, Inc. v. Stoneville Furniture Co., 134 IU. App. 3d 149, 479 N.E_2d 962
(1985); Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M. LaFave Co., 312 N.C. 224, 321 S.E.2d 872 (1984); Sentry
Eng'g and Const., Inc. v. Mariner's Cay Dev. Corp., 287 S.C. 346, 338 S.E.2d 631 (1985).
123. Servomation, 316 N.C. 544, 342 S.E.2d at 854.
124. 98 Nev. 488, 653 P.2d 1217 (1982).
125. Id. at 491, 653 P.2d at 1220. See also Hillman v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 758 P.2d
1248 (Alaska 1988).
126. 403 Mass. 772, 532 N.E.2d 681 (1989).
127. Id. at 777, 532 N.E.2d at 684. Cf Atlas v. 7101 Partnership, 109 I11. App. 3d 236, 440
N.E.2d 381 (1982) (court relied on the limited use of judicial resources to conclude there was no
waiver).
128. 63 Md. App. 96, 492 A.2d 319 (1985), afJ'd, 306 Md. 286, 508 A.2d 487 (1986).
129. Id. at 105, 492 A.2d at 324. See also Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Mid States Port Auth.,
242 Kan. 683, 751 P.2d 122 (1988); Lawrence v. Comprehensive Bus. Serv. Co., 833 F.2d 1159 (5th
Cir. 1987); Riverfront Properties, Ltd. v. Max Factor III, 460 So. 2d 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
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amended petition accompanied by an assertion that plaintiff should be bound by
arbitration clauses in the disputed contracts; (3) maintaining a consistent position
in all subsequent pleadings; and (4) no final judgment on the merits occurred, then
the defendant had not waived the right to compel arbitration because such acts did
not evidence a clear expression of intent to do So.
130
In Atkins v. Rustic Woods Partners,'13 the Illinois Appellate Court held that,
while most of the defendant's court action was in response to the plaintiff's
claims, some of its actions, such as seeking dissolution of the partnership with the
plaintiff and distribution of the partnership assets, evidenced an intent to pursue
rights in court and waive the right to compel arbitration.132
B. Right to Raise Claims
Claims may be deemed to be waived when a party fails to properly assert
them.13 3 In Hedlund v. Citizen's Security Mutual Insurance Co. of Red Wing, 34
the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a party could not be awarded costs or
prejudgment interest because the arbitrators had not awarded them, and because
they were requested only upon application for confirmation of the award. 35 The
court stated that failure to move for modification or correction of the award
resulted in a waiver of the claim for costs and prejudgment interest. 36
In Wanschura v. Western National Mutual Insurance Co.,37 the Minnesota
Court of Appeals denied prejudgment interest to the plaintiff who failed to ask that
it be included in the arbitration award. 38 Plaintiff asked for prejudgment
interest in his motion to confirm the arbitration award but the court held that it
could not award the interest upon a motion to confirm. 39
Failure to give timely written notice of a claim has been held to waive the
right to assert that claim."4 In Byron's Construction Co. v. North Dakota State
Highway Department,4 the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the state's
arbitration statute required Byron to give timely written notice of its claim for
130. District Moving, 63 Md. App. at 105, 492 A.2d at 324. See also Charles J. Frank, Inc. v.
Association of Jewish Charities, 294 Md. 443, 450 A.2d 1304 (1982). But see Detweiler v. J.C.
Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 110 Wash. 2d 99, 751 P.2d 282 (1988) (failure to take action in court was
evidence of a waiver of the right to arbitrate).
131. 171 Il1. App. 3d 373, 525 N.E.2d 551 (1988).
132. Id.
133. Hedlund v. Citizen's Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. of Red Wing, 377 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985). See also Rosecroft Trotting & Pacing Assoc. v. Electronic Race Patrol, 69 Md. App. 405, 518
A.2d 137 (1986).
134. Hedlund, 377 N.W.2d 460.
135. Id. at 464.
136. Id.
137. 389 N.W.2d 927 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
138. Id. at 928.
139. Id.
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additional compensation for construction work for the state. 142 The court further
held that Byron failed to give such notice and thus waived its right to assert the
claim in arbitration.
143
C. Right to Object to Arbitrability
A party can waive its right to object to arbitrability by submitting to an
arbitration proceeding on the merits of a claim without raising an objection to the
arbitration prior to the proceeding.'" In In Re Marriage of Gavend,'4- the
Supreme Court of Colorado held that a husband in a marriage dissolution case
waived his right to object to the arbitration by agreeing in writing to participate
in the process and by failing to object until after the arbitrator had delivered a
tentative award.146
D. Right to Assert Grounds for Vacation
A party may waive the right to assert grounds for vacation of an arbitration
award by failing to comply with the time requirements of the arbitration statute or
by failing to enter a timely appeal.1 47  In State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Cabs, Inc.,4 s State Farm sued on behalf of its policy holder for
injuries sustained in an accident with defendant's cab.149 The defendant sought
to vacate the arbitrator's ruling after the time for filing appeals under the
arbitration statute had elapsed. 50 The Colorado Supreme Court held that the
defendant's failure to enter a timely appeal from the arbitrator's judgment
constituted a waiver of its right to object to the confirmation of the arbitrator's
award.'
Similarly, in Walter A. Brown, Inc. v. Moylan, 52 an apartment owner
received an arbitration award against the managing agent of one of her apartments
and filed for confirmation of the award. The agent's answer sought vacation of
the award. However, the agent filed the answer 107 days after the delivery of the
142. Id. at 634.
143. Id.
144. Marriage of Gavend, 781 P.2d 161 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); see also Cady v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
113 Idaho 667, 747 P.2d 76 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987); Hot Springs County School Dist. v. Strube Constr.
Co., 715 P.2d 540 (Wyo. 1986); Jaffe v. Nocera, 493 A.2d 1003 (D.C. Ct. App. 1985).
145. Gavend, 781 P.2d at 161.
146. Id. at 162.
147. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cabs, Inc., 751 P.2d 61 (Colo. 1988). See also Littlejohn
v. Keystone Ins. Co., 353 Pa. Super. 63, 509 A.2d 334 (1986); Melton v. Lyon, 108 N.M. 420, 773
P.2d 732 (1989).
148. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 751 P.2d 61.
149. Id. at 62.
150. Id. at 63.
151. Id. at 67.
152. 509 A.2d 98 (D.C. 1986).
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award rather than within the maximum 90 days.' The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals held that the failure to make a timely answer waived the agent's
right to assert grounds for vacation of the award."5 4
IV. ARBITRABILITY
Prior to the passage by Congress of the F.A.A. and the passage by many state
legislatures of the U.A.A., both federal and state law were biased against
arbitration. 55 The theory at common law was that either party to an agreement
to arbitrate future disputes could void the agreement at any time. 6 However,
with the passage of the U.A.A. and F.A.A., and the accompanying legislative
history favoring the arbitral process, arbitration, has become commonplace as an
alternative to the traditional civil trial.'57
When considering the arbitrability of a given controversy, courts tend to ask
one or more of the following questions: (1) Does a valid agreement to arbitrate
exist?; (2) What did the parties intend as to the scope of the arbitration agree-
ment?; (3) What is the effect of previously adjudicated claims and issues?; (4) Is
the court or the arbitration panel the proper forum for determining the arbitrability
of the conflict?; (5) Are all or only some of the issues arising out of the conflict
subject to arbitration?; and (6) If all the claims arising out of the dispute are not
subject to arbitration, which claims are severable? The way various courts have
answered these questions is the subject of the following section.
A. Existence of Agreements
A typical problem courts encounter when determining the question of the
arbitrability of a dispute is whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. This
question can be better discussed when the sub-issues are broken down into the
following categories: revocation of agreements, unsigned agreements, and
incorporation by reference situations.
1. Revocation of Agreements
The issue of revocation of an arbitration agreement was raised in Hawker v.
North Michigan Hospital, Inc.'58 At issue was an agreement a patient signed
upon her admission to the hospital. 5 9 According to the agreement, the patient
153. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4311(b) (1981).
154. Brown, 509 A.2d at 100.
155. Meyerowitz, supra note 2, at 79.
156. Id.
157. Id
158. 164 Mich. App. 314, 416 N.W.2d 428 (1987).
159. Id at 317, 416 N.W.2d at 430.
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and the hospital were to submit any dispute between them to arbitration."W The
agreement specified that the duty to arbitrate could be revoked if written notice
was sent to the hospital within sixty days of release.' 6' The plaintiff contended
that she sent such a letter revoking arbitration to the hospital within the prescribed
sixty day limit. 62 The appellate court affirmed the validity of the agreement,
but also upheld the district court's finding that the letter revoking the agreement




A signed, written agreement to arbitrate is not necessary to bind the parties
to arbitration if a party's conduct treats an agreement to arbitrate as if it was in
effect. In Wetzel v. Sullivan," a dispute arose out of a former law partner's
stock valuation upon the termination of his interest in the law firm. 6 The
defendant had drafted and prepared a shareholder's and compensation agreement
which contained an arbitration clause.'6 The plaintiff signed the agreement;
however, the president and six of the shareholders did not.' 67 When the plaintiff
attempted to submit the dispute to arbitration, the defendants countered that no
valid arbitration agreement existed.'6
In reversing the lower court's decision denying arbitration, the appellate court
noted that courts generally favor arbitration and will indulge every reasonable
presumption to uphold arbitration proceedings.' 69 The court ruled that the
defendant was estopped from denying the existence of the agreement because it
had ratified the agreement as a matter of law by treating it as though it was in
effect throughout the two-year negotiation period and by accepting benefits and
issuing stock pursuant to the agreement. 7 °
Another court agreed that conduct can bind parties to an arbitration provision
contained in an unsigned contract., In Landmark Properties, Inc. v. Architects
International,7 the defendant sent a written contract containing an arbitration
agreement to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, while neither signing nor rejecting the
contract, indicated that they would pay the defendant, provided that all services
160. Id.
161. Id. at 318, 416 N.W.2d at 430.
162. Id.
163. Id at 431, 416 N.W.2d at 431.
164. 745 S.W.2d 78 (rex. C1. App. 1988).
165. Id at 79.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 80.
168. Id
169. Id at 81.
170. Id at 82.
171. 172 IMI. App. 3d 379, 526 N.F_.2d 603 (1988).
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were performed in accordance with the contract. 172  While the project was
proceeding, the plaintiffs stopped making payments and eventually the defendant
filed a demand for arbitration.1 73 The plaintiffs requested a mediation confer-
ence and submitted their claim before the arbitration board but later withdrew,
claiming they were not bound to arbitrate. 74  The court held that a valid
agreement to arbitrate existed. It noted that the plaintiffs' correspondence to the
defendant acknowledging the proposed contract, request for a mediation
conference, and original submission of the claim to arbitration showed conduct
related specifically to the written contract.
1 75
In certain instances, however, courts have refused to find the existence of a
valid, unsigned agreement to arbitrate. In Coswell & Wehrle v. Nicholson,'7 6
plaintiffs attempted to compel arbitration, asserting that a valid and binding
agreement to arbitrate existed. 7 7 The court found that although the plaintiffs
proposed a written agreement, defendants never signed the agreement or ratified
it by its conduct.17' Therefore, since private arbitration is wholly a creature of
contract, it was improper to arbitrate absent a valid agreement or some ratifying
conduct by the defendant. 79
3. Incorporation by Reference
An additional question that courts have adjudicated is whether an arbitral
clause may be incorporated by reference into a contract. In Jim Carlson
Construction, Inc. v. Bailey,180 the defendants appealed the trial court's denial
of their application to compel arbitration regarding a contract dispute with the
plaintiff.'8 ' A blank form was used, and in the area designated for other
documents to be incorporated by reference into the contract, several suggested
documents were listed in a parenthetical.8 2 One such document contained an
arbitration clause but the area beneath the parenthetical was left blank. 83 The
court ruled that since without any of the suggested documents listed in the
parenthetical there would be no contract, all suggested documents listed must
therefore be incorporated by reference; hence, the dispute was arbitrable.'
4
172. Id. at 380, 526 N.E.2d at 604.
173. Id. at 381, 526 N.E.2d at 605.
174. l
175. Id at 381, 526 N.F.2d at 606.
176: 780 P.2d 37 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
177. Id. at 38.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 769 S.W.2d 480 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
181. Id.
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In Sentry Engineering and Construction, Inc. v. Mariner's Cay Development
Corp.," the owner and contractor concurrently executed documents covering
construction costs (cost document) and profits and costs over construction (profit
document). The cost document contained an arbitration clause and incorporated
the profit document through an agreement modification provision." 6 The profit
document incorporated the cost document by reference. 87 The court found the
two documents had been executed for the single purpose of providing compensa-
tion for construction and, therefore, comprised a single contract." The court
ruled that the arbitration provision in the cost document applied to the contract as
a whole and not merely to the portion of the contract evidenced by the cost
document. 89
4. Agreement to Arbitrate Under Implied Contract Theory
In Shaffer v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board,'90 an employee filed a
petition with the Pennsylvania Board of Claims, seeking reimbursement for travel
expenses. The employee based his claim on a theory of implied contract.'9 '
The court ruled that this dispute was not arbitrable due to the fact that no express
agreement can exist under an implied contract theory. 92 Similarly, in Johnson
v. Travelers,93 the court refused to compel arbitration where the plaintiff sought
relief under an implied contract theory after he was struck and injured by an
uninsured motorist.' 94 Plaintiff used an implied contract theory to argue that,
pursuant to Pennsylvania law, all insurance contracts must provide for binding
arbitration to resolve disputes regarding uninsured motorist benefits. 95 Plaintiff
further argued that he was entitled to arbitration despite the fact that there was no
express arbitration agreement. 96 The court refused to order arbitration in the
absence of an express agreement between the parties. 97
B. Scope of Agreements
Since arbitration clauses are contractual in nature, principles of contract
determination must logically apply. The terms or scope of an arbitration
185. 287 S.C. 346, 338 S.E.2d 631 (1985).
186. Id. at ___, 338 S.E.2d at 632-33.
187. Id at ___, 338 S.E.2d at 633.
188. Id
189. Id at _, 338 S.E.2d at 633-34.
190. 92 Pa. Commw. 374, 500 A.2d 917 (1985).
191. Id at ___, 500 A.2d at 919.
192. Id at , 500 A.2d at 921.
193. 348 Pa. Super. 278, 502 A.2d 206 (1985).
194. Id. at __, 502 A.2d at 209.
195. Id. at., 502 A.2d at 208.
196. Id.
197. Id. at ___ 502 A.2d at 209.
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agreement determine which disputes will be submitted to arbitration. In United
Cable Television Corp. v. Northwest Illinois Cable Corp., 98 the defendant
brought an action to stay all arbitration proceedings that the plaintiff had
initiated.' 99 The trial court held that two out of the three issues involved in the
dispute were not arbitrable because they were not matters of "general policy
affecting business" of the partnership within the meaning of the arbitration
agreement.2' The Illinois Supreme Court held that partnership decisions as to
distribution of profits, allocation of tax credits, and depositing of funds were not
within the scope of the arbitration clause and denied arbitration as to those
issues.
2 °1
Other courts have encountered other issues regarding the scope of arbitration
agreements. In Michael-Curry Cos., Inc. v. Knutson Shareholders Liquidating
Trust,20 2 the issue was whether an arbitration clause was sufficiently broad to
establish whether the parties intended the issue of fraudulent inducement to be
arbitrated. 2 3 The court looked to the language of the arbitration clause which
read in part, "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of, or relating to . . .the
making... thereof, shall be settled by arbitration .... ."204 The court ruled that
the claim arose out of the formation or making of the contract and remanded for
arbitration.20 5
Similarly, in Ram Electronics Corp. v. Westley,2° plaintiff sued defendant
stockholder for injunctive relief under an agreement containing an arbitration
clause in connection with the sale of corporate assets. Defendant counterclaimed
for replevin of certain items plaintiff detained.2 7  The trial court denied
plaintiff's motion to compel arbitration as to the replevin claim.2° On appeal,
the appellate court ruled that the replevin action was arbitrable because the
defendant stockholder had signed the agreement in his individual capacity.2 9
C. Effect of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
In Paine Webber, Inc. v. Farnam,10 the defendants, against whom the
plaintiff brokerage firm had brought a civil action in state court, counterclaimed
against plaintiff in federal district court and moved to stay state court proceedings
198. 128 IH. 2d 301, 538 N.E.2d 547 (1989).
199. Id. at 304-05, 538 N.E.2d at 548.
200. Id.
201. 1& at 311-12, 538 N.E.2d at 552-53.
202. 449 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. 1989).
203. l.
204. 1& at 141.
205. Id.
206. 534 So. 2d 936 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
207. Id. at 936-37.
208. Id. at 937.
209. 1l
210. 870 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1989).
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pending arbitration.21 Meanwhile, an Illinois state court issued a stay order
pending arbitration of the defendant's claims.2 12 The federal district court judge
concluded that the plaintiff was precluded from relitigating arbitrability in federal
court.21'3 However, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the state court
order staying the plaintiff's suit against the defendants pending arbitration of the
defendant's claims would not be given preclusive effect in federal court pursuant
to the law of the case doctrine. 1 4
In Metropolitan Airports Commission v. Metropolitan Airports Police
Federation,215 the trial court overturned an arbitrator's award on the grounds that
he exceeded his authority. The court of appeals denied discretionary review and
dismissed the appeal. 2 6 The Minnesota Supreme Court, in granting discretion-
ary review, held that regardless of whether a trial court's judgment was appeal-
able, both the Supreme Court and the court of appeals had the authority to grant
discretionary review as a matter of independent determination. 2 '7
In Jackson Trak Group, Inc. v. Mid States Port Authority,1 8 the court ruled
that an arbitrator is not collaterally estopped from deciding an issue where an
injunction was sought in a prior judicial proceeding in which the court stated it
was not ruling on the issue.219 The defense argued for applying collateral
estoppel on the issue of liability for seizure of the plaintiff's equipment where the
plaintiff had unsuccessfully sought an injunction. 2 0 The court ruled that the
breach of contract issue was not decided in the injunction action, and therefore,
the arbitrator was not precluded from addressing that point.22'
Finally, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in In re Law Enforcement Labor
Service, Inc.,222 held that absent specific language precluding arbitration on an
issue, the agreement between the parties to arbitrate is binding.223 The defendant
argued that the language of the contract gave it the right to make choices in regard
to personnel selection.224 The court disagreed, holding that the specific provi-
sions of the collective bargaining agreement at issue did not preserve the right of
the defendant to make such personnel choices and that the dispute was arbitrable. 22
211. Id. at 1287.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1290.
215. 443 N.W.2d 519 (Minn. 1989).
216. Id. at 522.
217. 1& at 524.
218. 242 Kan. 683, 751 P.2d 122 (1988).
219. Id. at 692, 751 P.2d at 129.
220. Id. at 690, 751 P.2d at 129.
221. 'Id. at 692, 751 P.2d at 129.
222. 414 N.W.2d 452 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
223. Id at 457.
224. Id
225. l
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D. Proper Forum for Determining Arbitrability
The question of whether an issue is arbitrable is one at law, and a court must
make its own determination on the issue. In Anderson v. Elliot,226 the court was
faced with a dispute arising out of a fee arbitration between an attorney and his
client. After the arbitration award was handed down the attorney sought to
overturn the award on the basis that the bar rules requiring that the attorney submit
to fee arbitration unconstitutionally denied his right to a trial by jury. 7 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the attorney failed to preserve any
constitutional objection to the fee arbitration by acquiescing to the client's choice
of forum and failing to object to the arbitration panel until he learned the award
was adverse to him.228
In Poire v. Kaplan,229 a suit between two joint venturers, the defendant
filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that the exclusive remedy
available to the plaintiff was arbitration. The court ordered arbitration, and an
award was rendered for the plaintiff.230 The defendant then claimed that the
issues in her motion to dismiss were not arbitrabie. 23' The court of appeals
rejected the defendant's argument, finding that the trial court had questioned the
parties prior to arbitration and concluded that the entire dispute was subject to
arbitration.3 2
In McCary Engineering Corp. v. Town of Upland, 33 plaintiff employed
defendant engineering corporation to prepare applications for federal grants.
Unknowingly, the plaintiff town board's president signed contracts for additional
services, which had been inserted into a stack of forms requiring his signature.234
Plaintiff attempted to terminate the contract because the board president had no
authority to bind the town." In response, the defendant engineering corporation
sought a demand for arbitration, which the trial court denied.236 On appeal, the
court held that because the town questioned the authority of the board president,
it disputed the validity of the contract and its arbitration clause.237 The court
ruled that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine arbitrability and affirmed the
stay of arbitration.23
226. 555 A.2d 1042 (Me. 1989).
227. Id. at 1043.
228. Id. at 1045.
229. 491 A.2d 529 (D.C. 1985).
230. Id at 530.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 533.
233. 472 N.E.2d 1305,(Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
234. Id. at 1306.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1307.
238. Id. at 1308.
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In Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Maurizio,239 the court
noted that in determining the question of arbitrability, trial courts are to avoid
ruling on the substantive provisions of the contract.24 The court refused to rule
on an anti-stacking provision in an insurance contract because to do so would
encroach on the merits of the case. 4'
E. Arbitrability of Specific Claims
In Board of Education of Warren Township High School District 121 v.
Warren Township High School Federation of Teachers, Local 504,242 plaintiff
school board brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment as to the
arbitrability of a teacher's grievance and a preliminary injunction to prevent the
defendant union from arbitrating the grievance.243 The trial court preliminarily
enjoined arbitration, and appeal was taken.2" The Illinois Supreme Court
reversed, holding that under Illinois law trial courts do not retain power to enjoin
arbitration in the context of public education labor disputes.245
Conversely, under Pennsylvania law a trial court had jurisdiction in the
context of public education labor disputes to make a preliminary determination of
whether a particular issue was arbitrable under the terms of a collective-bargaining
24agreement." In Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School Education
Association v. Executive Council of Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
School,24 7 the plaintiff executive council requested a stay of arbitration arising
out of a teacher's dismissal on the grounds that there was no agreement to
arbitrate.2 8 The trial court stayed arbitration and the appellate court affirmed,
ruling that the trial court had exercised proper jurisdiction.
In Hall v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,249 a Florida appellate court
affirmed a trial court order compelling arbitration. The court rejected the plaintiff
policyholder's contention that the claim was not arbitrable in that it violated
provisions of a Florida law guaranteeing an insured the right of access to the
courts.250  The court explained that the statute the plaintiff relied upon was
239. 129 Mich. App. 166, 341 N.W.2d 262 (1983).
240. Id. at 176, 341 N.W.2d at 267.
241. Id. at 176-77, 341 N.W.2d at 268.
242. 128 1lI. 2d 155, 538 N.E.2d 524 (1989).
243. Id. at 159, 538 N.E.2d at 526.
244. Id.
245. Id at 164, 538 N.E.2d at 528.
246. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School Educ. Ass'n v. Executive Council of Middle
Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 122 Pa. Commw. 595, 552 A.2d 763 (1989).
247. Id.
248. Id. at , 552 A.2d at 764.
249. 454 So. 2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
250. Id. at 713.
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applicable with disability policies rather than life insurance policies like that held
by the plaintiff.25'
F. Severability of Claims
The issue of severability arises when a claim submitted is not arbitrable. The
question is whether the arbitrable issue(s) can be heard separately by the arbitrator
or must be heard by a court. In Himmelstein v. Valenti Dev. Corp., 2 2 the court
ruled that a pre-contract tortious misrepresentation claim was not arbitrable. It
severed that claim from the others that were remanded to the trial court for
decision.z 3
In City of Hot Springs v. Gunderson's, Inc., 4 the plaintiff city sued an
architectural firm and a contractor for negligence and breach of contract in the
design and construction of a golf course. The contractor's contract contained an
arbitration clause, but the architect's contract did not."5  The South Dakota
Supreme Court held that the trial court's denial of the contractor's motion to
compel arbitration was improper.2 6 It ruled that a court must consider the
propriety of severing claims before denying arbitration on the ground that multiple
suits might result in different forums.257
In Lynch v. Three Ponds Co.,"58 part of an arbitral award was held to be
void because it contained an issue that was not subject to arbitration. The court
held that the part of the award that dealt with matters covered by the arbitration
agreement was severable from the void portion and could not be set aside absent
a showing of other grounds for vacation of the award.29
V. COMPELLING ARBITRATION AND STAYING LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Compelling Arbitration
Section 2 of the U.A.A. permits proceedings to compel or stay arbitra-
tion.2 " Under the U.A.A. a party may compel arbitration by showing both an
251. lId
252. 103 11. App. 3d 911, 431 N.E.2d 1299 (1982).
253. Id. at 914-15, 431 N.E.2d at 1302.
254. 322 N.W.2d 8 (S.D. 1982).
255. Id. at 9.
256. Id. at 11.
257. Id.
258. 656 P.2d 51 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
259. Id. at 53-54.
260. See U.A.A. §§ 2(a), (b).
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agreement to arbitrate and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate. 6' Because
arbitration is a contractual remedy the contract determines the limitations,
conditions and restrictions on arbitration.262
When a petition to compel arbitration is filed, the court's role is to make a
threshold determination of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists between the
parties and whether such agreement includes arbitration of the specific point in
dispute.26' The court will compel arbitration if it finds a valid agreement which
covers the dispute. Courts should not make substantive decisions on the merits
of the dispute.264
The issue of statutory requirements in a proceeding to compel arbitration was
addressed in Proper v. Don Conolly Construction Co., Inc.26 Appellant asserted
that section 682.03(1), Florida Statute (1987), requires a trial court to conduct a
full evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was an agreement to arbitrate
before granting or denying a motion for an order compelling arbitration.26
Section 682.03(1) states that a trial court, upon finding that a substantial issue is
raised as to the making of an agreement or provision concerning arbitration, shall
"summarily hear and determine the issue and according to its determination, shall
grant or deny the application. '"2 67 The appellate court held that the trial court
properly complied with the statutory requirements by summarily hearing the issue
and making a determination based on the contract itself.
26
In TDE LTD. v. Israel,269 the owner-defendants appealed a circuit court
order denying their motion to dismiss plaintiff's lawsuit or, alternatively, to stay
litigation proceedings and to compel arbitration.270 The court reversed the circuit
court's order denying defendant's motion to compel arbitration. The court relied
on Section 2(a) of the U.A.A., which enumerates the events which trigger the
parties' obligation to arbitrate, namely: an agreement to arbitrate and a refusal by
261. U.A.A. § 2 provides:
On application of a party showing an agreement described in Sec. 1 [an arbitration
agreement], and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the Court shall order the parties
to proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing party denies the existence of the agreement
to arbitrate, the Court shall proceed summarily to the determination of the issue so raised
and shall order arbitration if found for the moving party, otherwise the application shall
be denied.
Id.
262. E.g., Christmas v. Cimarron Realty Co., 98 N.M. 330, 332, 648 P.2d 788, 790 (1982); Knut
Co. v. Knutson Constr. Co., 433 N.W.2d 149 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
263. E.g., Knutson Constr. Co., 433 N.W.2d 149; TDE LTD. v. Israel, 185 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 541
N.E.2d 1281 (IM. App. Ct. 1989).
264. Proper v. Don Conolly Constr. Co., 546 So. 2d 758 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 759.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 759-60.'
269. TDE LTD., 185 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 541 N.E.2d 1281.
270. Id. at _._ 541 N.E.2d at 1282.
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the party opposing arbitration to do so. 27' These factors were present in this
case; therefore, compelling arbitration and staying the litigation was proper.
In Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,272 the district court denied a
motion to compel arbitration because the cause of action involved a federal civil
rights claim of sex discrimination. On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's
conclusion that, as a matter of law, neither the F.A.A. nor the Minnesota Uniform
Arbitration Act require arbitration of sex discrimination claims brought under the
Minnesota Human Rights Act. 273 The court relied heavily on several cases,274
one of which stated that:
Congress has articulated an intent through the text and legislative
history of Title VII to preclude waiver of judicial remedies for violation
of both federal Title VII rights and parallel state statutory rights, thereby
exempting state statutes from the provisions of the Federal Arbitration
Act. We emphasize that we reach this holding based upon the
legislative history and congressional intent manifested by Congress in
passing Title VII.
275
B. Staying Legal Proceedings
Any legal proceeding involving an arbitrable issue shall be stayed when an
order to compel arbitration has issued or when an application for such an order
has been made.276 Therefore, an order compelling arbitration will generally be
accompanied by an order to stay legal proceedings pending the outcome of the
arbitration. If the legal proceeding includes issues unrelated to the arbitration,
these issues may be severed, with the stay applying only to the arbitrable
issues.277
Courts generally encourage enforcement of executory arbitration agree-
ments,27s providing for expeditious, inexpensive dispute resolution without
271. Id. at _, 541 N.E.2d at 1287.
272. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 449 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
273. Id. at 470.
274. See Swenson v. Management Recruiters tnt't, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, _ U.S. _, 110 S. Ct. 143 (1989); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
275. Anderson, 449 N.W.2d at 469.
276. U.A.A. § 2(d) states:
Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration shall be stayed
if an order for arbitration or an application therefor has been made under this section or,
if the issue is severable, the stay may be with respect thereto only. When the application
is made in such action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include such stay.
Id.
277. Id.
278. E.g., Kurland Steel v. Carle Found. Hosp., 185 111. App. 3d 624, 541 N.E.2d 862 (1989); J
& K Cement Constr. Inc. v. Montalbano Builders, Inc., 119 I11. App. 3d 663, 456 N.E.2d 889 (1983);
Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. Ass'n of Jewish Charities, 294 Md. 443, _ 450 A.2d 1304, 1312 (1982).
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judicial involvement.279 Litigation may be stayed even though the parties have
not executed an agreement to arbitrate when the need for litigation may be
obviated by the results of other, related arbitration.28°
The policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements outweighed the
policies favoring joinder in Kurland Steel v. Carle Foundation Hospital.2s A
dispute arose between the general contractor (English Brothers) and the owner
(Carle Foundation Hospital). Their contract contained an arbitration clause.
English Brothers and Kurland Steel had entered into subcontract which contained
an indemnification clause in favor of English Brothers but did not include an
agreement to arbitrate.
Kurland filed a motion for declaratory judgment. It asked the court to issue
a preliminary injunction staying the arbitration between English Brothers and the
Carle Foundation pending court resolution of the rights and obligations of all
parties involved. 2  The hospital filed a motion to dismiss. The motion was
granted, and the subcontractor filed an interlocutory appeal. On appeal the court
held that the trial court had properly dismissed the subcontractor's complaint since
the subcontractor failed to allege the contract between the hospital and the general
contractor lacked an agreement to arbitrate. 283
The court rejected the arguments that the arbitration between the hospital and
the general contractor would hinder judicial economy or promote inconsistent
results.' The court states that arbitration will serve to define the issues and
make more manageable the dispute of the parties outside the arbitration agreement,
and that joinder of multiple parties frequently fails to save time and money. 2'
The court concludes that judicial economy is an inadequate reason for ignoring the
existence of the arbitration agreement.28 6
The policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements also prevailed in
Kidder Electric v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty.287 When a controversy arose
between the subcontractor and the general contractor, the subcontractor instituted
an arbitration proceeding as provided for in an agreement between the two parties.
Thereafter, to toll the statute of limitations, the subcontractor filed its action
against the surety on the payment bond.2a In its complaint the subcontractor
279. Comment, The Uniform Arbitration Act in Missouri, 46 MO. L REv. 627, 630 (1981).
280. E.g., Forest City Dillon, Inc. v. Superior Court for Pima, 138 Ariz. 410, 675 P.2d 297 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1984); Post Tensioned Eng'g Corp. v. Fairways Plaza Assocs., 429 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983); Kurland Steel, 185 Il. App. 3d 624, 541 N.E.2d 862.
281. Kurland Steel, 185 Ill. App. 3d 624, 541 N.E.2d 862.
282. Id. at ___, 541 N.E.2d at 862.
283. Id.
284. Id. at , 541 N.E.2d at 865.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. 530 So. 2d 475 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
288. Id. at 476.
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moved to stay the bond action against the surety until conclusion of the pending
arbitration proceeding.9
The general contractor, as intervenor in the bond action, and the surety
company jointly moved to stay the arbitration proceeding until the conclusion of
the bond litigation.290 The trial court granted the general contractor's and
surety's motion to stay the arbitration proceedings.
The subcontractor appealed and the appellate court reversed the trial court.
The appellate court stated that regardless of who prevails in the arbitration, the
arbitration determination will eliminate the issue in the bond litigation. Therefore,
in order to effectuate the arbitration provision in the contract between the
contractor and the subcontractor, to permit the subcontractor to toll the statute of
limitations on its cause of action on the bond, and to avoid unnecessary litigation,
the arbitration proceeding should be permitted to proceed, and the bond litigation
should be stayed29' While the surety never agreed to arbitrate any claim against
it on its bond, nevertheless, the surety's principal (the contractor) agreed with the
subcontractor to arbitrate what was essentially the same claim.
2 92
C. Costs
The fees and expenses of arbitration, except for attorney's fees, are
determined and allocated by the arbitrator.293 In Leaf v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,294 the insured appealed a circuit court order granting
her petition to compel arbitration but striking her claim for attorney fees. The
district court reversed the circuit court's denial of attorney fees. The court held
that State Farm's failure to respond to Leaf's letter advising it of her selection of
an arbitrator could be deemed to have "wrongfully caused Leaf to resort to
litigation to resolve a conflict which was reasonably within State Farm's power to
resolve."
295
VI. THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDING
Parties may specify in their arbitration agreement the procedures to be used
in their arbitration hearing.29  In the absence of any such agreement, the





292. Id. at 477.
293. Cf. Kessel v. Dugand, 508 So. 2d 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
294. Leaf v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 544 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
295. Id. at 1050.
296. See U.AA. § 5.
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In Byron's Construction v. State Highway Department,297 Byron's, the
contractor, appealed from a district court judgment affirming an arbitration panel's
decision. The panel had denied all of Byron's claims against the North Dakota
State Highway Department. 29 The arbitrators had bifurcated the proceedings to
first consider the notice issue. Following an evidentiary hearing the arbitrators
determined that Byron's failed to give the Highway Department timely written
notice of its intent to claim additional compensation.2
On appeal Byron's asserted that the relevant facts on the merits were so
intertwined with the notice issue that the arbitrators could not properly decide the
notice issue without first receiving evidence on the merits or substance of Byron's
claims.3°° The court concluded that the arbitrators did not err in bifurcating the
hearing and did not prejudice or compromise Byron's right to introduce relevant
evidence since the arbitrators did not preclude Byron's from introducing whatever
evidence it thought necessary for the arbitrators to consider in deciding the notice
issue."'
VII. CONFIRMATION AND VACATION OF AWARDS
Courts give great deference to arbitration awards; thus, arbitration awards are
generally confirmed unless a party can show that one of the statutory grounds for
vacation outlined in Section 12 of the U.A.A. has been met. The purpose for
affording courts a limited role in the arbitration process is to preserve the integrity
of alternative dispute resolution. If courts were allowed to review arbitral
decisions de novo there would be no purpose in seeking arbitration, and the
process would be undermined.
A. Arbitrator Misconduct, Partiality, and Bias
Section 12(a)(2) of the U.A.A. provides that an arbitrator's award may be
vacated upon a showing of partiality or misconduct prejudicing the right of any
party.302
297. Byron's Const. Co. v. North Dakota State Highway Dep't, 448 N.W.2d 630 (N.D. 1989).
298. Id. at 631.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 632.
301. Id.
302. See also Hooten Const. Co. v. Borsberry Const. Co., 108 N.M. 192, 769 P.2d 726 (N.M.
1989); Goeller v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 376 Pa. Super. 608, 546 A.2d 690 (1988); Coughlan Const.
Co. v. Town of Rockport, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 994, 505 N.E.2d 203 (1987); Wyndham v. Haines, 305
Md. 269, 503 A.2d 719 (1986); Turner v. Nicholson Properties, 80 N.C. App. 208, 341 S.E.2d 42
(1986); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Stariha, 346 N.W.2d 663 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Bernstein v. Grammercy
Mills, Inc., 16 Mass. App. Ct. 403,452 N.E.2d 231 (1983); Renwin v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc.,
107 I11. App. 3d 799, 438 N.E.2d 509 (1982); Foley Co. v. Grindsted Products, Inc. 233 Kan. 339, 662
P.2d 1254 (1983).
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Melton v. Lyon3 3 stands for the proposition that, before an award may be
set aside because the arbitrator was impartial or biased, "the evidence of bias or
interest of an arbitrator must be direct, definite, and capable of demonstration
rather than remote, uncertain, or speculative."3' 0 In Melton, the court ruled that
there was not sufficient evidence of bias where the arbitrator failed to disclose that
he was previously employed by business competitors of the appellants, since he
had no ongoing relationship with the competitor. 5
In Hartman v. Cooper,3 6 the court overturned the arbitrator's award and
held that the appearance of possible bias was sufficient to require the vacation of
the award.3"
A party seeking to have an award vacated for arbitrator misconduct must not
only show misconduct but also that the party has in fact incurred prejudice as a
result of the misconduct.3°
In Fort Wayne Community Schools v. Fort Wayne Education Association,3
the party seeking to have the award vacated alleged that the arbitrator had slept
during the testimony of one of its expert witnesses. 310 Noting that several other
experts had testified on the same topic and that the arbitrator's decision contained
material substantially similar to that contained in the expert's affidavit, the court
found that the party had failed to show it had been prejudiced.31
In L & H Airco v. Rapistan Corp.,312 the court held that vacation of an
award is the proper remedy when an arbitrator fails to disclose a current or prior
relationship with a party to the proceeding.31 3 In this case, the court held that
the arbitrator is immune from civil liability, although the arbitrator is not insulated
from criminal sanctions for fraud or corruption or from sanctions imposed by the
arbitrator's governing body.31 4
303. 108 N.M. 420, 773 P.2d 732 (N.M. 1989).
304. Id. at __, 773 P.2d at 734.
305. Id. at ____,773 P.2d at 734-35.
306. 59 Md. App. 154, 474 A.2d 959 (1984), cert. denied, 301 Md. 41, 481 A.2d 801.
307. Id. at 168, 474 A.2d at 967. See also Calabrese v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 187 Ill. App.
3d 349, 543 N.E.2d 215 (1989); Egan & Sons Co. v. Mears Park Dev. Co., 164 Ill. App. 3d 660, 414
N.W.2d 785 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Hahn v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 518 N.E.2d 218 (1987).
308. Fort Wayne Community Schools v. Fort Wayne Educ. Ass'n, 490 N.E.2d 337 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986); See also Int'l Medical Centers v. Sabates, 498 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986);
AFSCME Council 65 v. Aitkin County, 357 N.W.2d 432 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Beebout v. St. Paul
Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 365 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Metro. Dade County v. Molloy 456
So. 2d 1280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (per curiam); State v. Davidson & Jones Constr. Co., 72 N.C.
App. 149, 323 S.E.2d 466 (1984).
309. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 490 N.E.2d 337.
310. Id. at 339.
311. Id. at 340.
312. 446 N.W.2d 372 (Minn. 1989).
313. Id. at 377.
314. Id. at 377-78.
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B. The Arbitrator's Scope of Authority
An award may be vacated if the arbitrator exceeds his authority.3" 5 An
arbitrator's powers are generally defined in the arbitration agreement. "Great
deference is given to an arbitrator's decision, an arbitrator's power is confined to
interpretation and application of the agreement and he does not have the power to
dispense his own brand of industrial justice. 316
In Local 964 v. County of Lawrence,3"7 the court held that the arbitrator
exceeded her scope of authority when the award "could not in any way be
rationally derived from the agreement."" 8 The court acknowledged its limited
role in reviewing arbitration awards and held that "an arbitrator's decision may not
be disturbed so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agree-
ment."319 Under the essence test, the court must determine whether an
arbitrator's interpretation can in "any rational way be derived from the collective
bargaining agreement, viewed in light of its language, its context and other indicia
of the parties' intention."320 In Local 964, the court held that because the
arbitrator's decision could not be rationally derived from the agreement, the
arbitrator exceeded her scope of authority in reaching the decision.
321
In Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega,322 the court held that an
arbitrator exceeds his authority when he "goes beyond the authority granted by the
parties or the operative documents and decides an issue not pertinent to the
315. UA.A. § 12(aX3). See Kilianek v. Kim, 192 11. App. 3d 139,548 N.E.2d 598 (1989); Jontig
v. Bay Metro. Transp. Auth., 178 Mich. App. 499, 444 N.W.2d 178 (1989); Metro. Airports Comm'ni
v. Metro. Airports Police Fed'n, 443 N.W.2d 519 (Minn. 1989); Snyder v. Berliner Const. Co., Inc.,
79 Md. App. 29, 555 A.2d 523 (1989); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Goldenberg, 435 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989); Container Technology v. J. Gadsden Pty., Ltd., 781 P.2d 119 (Colo. App. 1989) (arbitrator
did not exceed the scope of his authority; an unfavorable interpretation of a contract is not a basis to
set aside an award); E.D.S. Constr. Co..v. North End Health Center, Inc., 412 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987); Grobert File Co., Inc. v. RTC Sys., 524 N.E.2d 404 (Mass. Ct. App. 1988); Hennepin
.County Ambulance Drivers Ass'n v. County of Hennepin, 394 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986);
South Conejos School Dist. v. Martinez, 709 P.2d 594 (Co. Ct. App. 1985); Prince George County
Educator's Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 61 Md. App. 249, 486 A.2d 228 (1985), cert. granted, 492 A.2d
616; Duluth Police Union v. Duluth, 360 N.W.2d 367 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Plymouth-Carver
Regional School Dist. v. David M. Crawley Assoc's Inc., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 455 N.E. 2d 990
(1983); AFSCME District Council 96 v. Indep. School Dist. No. 381, Two Harbors, 351 N.W.2d 33
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Iowa City Community School Dist. v. Iowa City Educ. Ass'n, 343 N.W.2d 139
(Iowa 1983); Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 105 Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (Idaho
1983); Foley Co. v. Grindsted Products, Inc. 233 Kan. 339, 662 P.2d 1254 (1983); AFSCME v. Dept.
of Corrections, 192 Il. App. 3d 108, 548 N.E.2d 592 (IlI. App. 1989); Maine State Employees Ass'n
v. State, 517 A.2d 58 (Me. 1986).
316. Laborers Int'l Union of North Am., Local Union No. 964 v. County of Lawrence, 128 Pa.
Commw. 216, 563 A.2d 224 (1989).
317. Id. at 224.
318. Id. at 227.
319. Id. at 226.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 227.
322. 542 So. 2d 1327 (Fla.. 1989).
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resolution of the issue submitted to arbitration." 323 In Schnurmacher, since the
arbitrator decided the issue submitted to him there was no merit to the contention
that he exceeded his authority.324
David Co. v. Jim W. Miller Construction, Inc .3 1 is a case which exempli-
fies the "general trend of courts, in the absence of limiting language in the contract
itself, to accord judicial deference and afford flexibility to arbitrators to fashion
awards comporting with the circumstances out of which the disputes arose.
'3 26
Thus, in this case, the court confirmed an arbitration award which was equitable
in nature. The panel required the contractor, whom the building owner alleged to
have constructed buildings with numerous building defects, to purchase the land
from the owner. The court affirmed that it was proper to require the responsible
party to remedy the gross construction deficiency and bear the risk of potential
future warranty liabilities.
327
C. Refusal to Hear Evidence Material to the Controversy
A court may vacate an arbitration award where the arbitrator refuses to hear
evidence that is material to the controversy when that refusal results in substantial
prejudice to the rights of a party.3z
In AFL-CIO v. Department of Corrections,329 the circuit court vacated an
award on the ground that the arbitrator's refusal to hear material evidence by
applying the exclusionary rule outside the realm of criminal law violated public
323. Id. at 1329. See also Snyder, 79 Md. App. at _, 555 A.2d at 528 (arbitrator exceeded
scope of authority by issuing award which was "beyond purview of the submission" which defined the
arbitrator's jurisdiction); Hetrick v. Weimer, 67 Md. App. 522, 508 A.2d 522 (1986); Fryer v. Nat'l
Union Fire Ins. Co., 365 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1985); City of Worchester v. Granger Bros., Inc., 19
Mass. App. 379, 474 N.E.2d 1151 (1985); McDonald v. Hardee County School Bd., 448 So. 2d 593
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, 456 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1984).
324. Schnurmacher Holding, 542 So. 2d at 1329.
325. 444 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1989).
326. Id. at 841. See also Hooten Const. Co. v. Borsberry Const. Co., 108 N.M. 192, 769 P.2d
726 (N.M. 1989); Stewart v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 104 N.M. 744, 726 P.2d 1374 (1986);
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Wise, 150 Ariz. 16, 721 P.2d 674 (1986); Missouri Mining, Inc. v. St.
Joseph Light & Power Co., 703 S.W.2d 94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Moseley v. Brewer, 139 Ariz. 540,
679 P.2d 563 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). Contra City of DeKalb v. Local 1236, 182 Ill. App. 3d 367, 538
N.E.2d 867 (1989) (although courts allow flexibility and deference to arbitrators to fashion awards, an
award may not stand if it is contrary to public policy); Aamot v. Eneboe, 352 N.W.2d 647 (S.D. 1984)
(court did not allow arbiter flexibility).
327. David Co., 444 N.W.2d at 842.
328. U.AA. § 12(aX4). See Wayne Insulation Co., Inc. v. Hex Corp., 534 A.2d 1279 (D.C.
1987); Wildwoods of Lake Johnson Assocs. v. LP. Cox Co., 88 N.C. App. 88, 362 S.E.2d 615 (1987);
McLeroy v. Waller, 21 Ark. App. 292, 731 S.W.2d 789 (1987); Golub v. Spivey, 70 Md. App. 147,
520 A.2d 394 (1987), cert. denied, 310 Md. 2, 526 A.2d 954; Farm Constr. Serv., Inc. v. Robinson,
21 Mass App. 955, 487 N.E.2d 873 (1986).
329. 192 Ill. App. 3d 108, 548 N.E.2d 592 (1989).
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policy. 33° The circuit court then remanded the case, stating that on remand the
arbitrator must consider evidence he previously excluded.331
D. No Arbitration Agreement
If no arbitration agreement exists arbitrators have no authority to resolve
disputes. Consequently, a court can vacate an award upon a showing that an
arbitrator made an award in the absence of an arbitration agreement.332
In Wigod v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange,333 the court held that persons
not parties to a valid arbitration agreement cannot be compelled to submit to
arbitration.3 34 In this case, the court vacated the award, even though the plaintiff
had agreed to abide by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange's arbitration rules,
because the court found that the arbitration rules were not made compulsory under.
the express terms of the rules.335
In Hot Springs County School District v. Strube Construction Co.,336 the
court held that the parties' participation in the arbitration process amounted to a
waiver of their right to dispute the existence of an arbitration agreement. 37
E. Errors of Fact or Law
A mere error of fact or law made by the arbitrator is not sufficient grounds
to vacate an award.338  The appellate court in Jontig v. Bay Metropolitan
330. Id. at _, 548 N.E.2d at 594.
331. Id.
332. U.AA. § 12(aX5). See also Marino v. Tagarbs, 395 Mass. 397, 480 N.E.2d 286 (1985).
333. 141 Ill. App. 3d 129, 490 N.E.2d 39 (1986).
334. Id. at 132, 490 N.E.2d at 41.
335. Id.
336. 715 P.2d 540 (Wyo. 1986).
337. Id. at 546. See also Helmrichs v. Bank of Minneapolis & Trust Co., 349 N.W.2d 326 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1984).
338. The UA.A. does not provide for vacation on these grounds and courts generally follow this
proposition holding that only those grounds statutorily listed in the U.A.A. are grounds for vacating
an arbitration award. See Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1989); Hooten
Const. Co. v. Borsberry Const. Co., 108 N.M. 192, 193,769 P.2d 726, 727 (N.M. 1989) (court refused
to vacate award where decision was based on such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support the decision); Gruman v. Hendrickson, 416 N.W.2d 497 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987);
Arkansas Dep't of Parks and Tourism v. Resort Managers, Inc., 294 Ark. 255,743 S.W.2d 389 (1988);
Kalish v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 166 Ill. App. 3d 406, 519 N.E.2d 1031 (1988); Anderson v. Willey, 514
A.2d 807 (Me. 1986); School Comm. of Quincy v. Quincy Educ. Ass'n, 22 Mass. App. 914, 491
N.E.2d 672 (1986); Wicomico County Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 59 Md. App. 564, 477 A.2d 279
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984); Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Boston Carmen's Union, Div. 589,
17 Mass. App. 104, 455 N.E.2d 1231 (1983), appeal denied, 390 Mass. 1106, 459 N.E.2d 824 (1984);
Cabus v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 54 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Bingham County Comm'n v.
Interstate Elec. Co., 105 Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (Idaho 1983); Foley Co. v. Grindsted Products, Inc.
233 Kan. 339, 662 P.2d 1254 (1983).
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Transportation Authority339 held that the circuit court correctly vacated the award
where it appeared, on the face of the award, that the arbitrator made an error of
law so substantial that the award would have been different but for the error.340
In Patrick v. Cherokee Insurance Co.,341 the court held that an award may
be vacated as contrary to law when, had it been a jury verdict, the court could
have entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 2
F. Award Would Not Have Been Granted by a Court
The fact that an award could not or would not have been granted by a court
is not a ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award?. 3 In Department
of Public Safety v. Public Safety Employees Association,3" the trial court vacated
the arbitrator's award on the ground that the award was based on gross error."
The Supreme Court of Alaska upheld the arbitrator's decision, recognizing the
strong public policy favoring arbitration. The court also acknowledged that
disputants would have little incentive to enter into arbitration if courts were
allowed to vacate an award merely because they found their own interpretation to
be better reasoned than the arbitrator's.3 6 As long as the arbitrator's interpreta-
tion is reasonable in light of the circumstances and the scope of the award could
have been reasonably foreseen, a reviewing court should not interfere with an
arbitration award.347
339. 178 Mich. App. 499, 444 N.W.2d 178 (1989).
340. Id. at 502-04, 444 N.W.2d at 180-81. See aLso Azpell v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 382 Pa.
Super. 255, 555 A.2d 168 (1989); Texas West Oil & Gas Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 726 P.2d 1056, 1061-62
(Wyo. 1986), reh 'g denied, 749 P.2d 278 (Wyo. 1988) (statutory list of grounds is not exclusive and
court may vacate for manifest mistake of law); Bailey & Williams v. Westfall, 727 S.W.2d 86 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987); Prince George County Educator's Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 61 Md. App. 249, 486
A.2d 228 (1985), cert. granted, 492 A.2d 616; (arbitrator had exceeded his authority by making a
clearly erroneous finding of fact; thus, the court vacated the award); City of Worchester v. Granger
Bros., Inc., 19 Mass. App. 379, 474 N.E.2d 1151 (1985); Western Waterproofing Co. v. Lindenwood
Colleges, 662 S.W.2d 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Taunton Mun. Light Plant v. Paul L. Gerringer &
Assocs., 560 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Mass. 1983), aff'd mem., 725 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1983); Detroit Auto.
Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Gavin, 416 Mich. 407, 331 N.W.2d 418 (1982).
341. 354 Pa. Super. 427, 512 A.2d 24 (1986).
342. Id. at 429, 512 A.2d at 25 (citing Pennsylvania Arbitration Act).
343. U.A.A. § 12 (a). See Minnesota State Patrol Troopers Ass'n v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety,
437 N.W.2d 670 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Bingham County Comm'n, 105 Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046;
David Co. v. Miller Constr., Inc., 428 N.W.2d 590 (Minn. 1988).
344. 732 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1987).
345. Id. at 1093.
346. Id. at 1093-96.
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G. Validity of Award
Invalid awards are generally void and unenforceable and as such are
generally subject to vacation.34 When a party attacks the validity of an arbitral
award, it bears the burden of sustaining the attack.
3 49
In Schmidt v. Midwest Family Mutual Insurance Co., ° the court held that
the arbitration award was valid and should be confirmed notwithstanding the
insurer's claim of a right to trial de novo pursuant to a clause in the arbitration
agreement which provided for a trial de novo if the award exceeded the statutory
minimum.35' The Supreme Court of Minnesota held the de novo clause invalid,
noting that there are strong policy reasons for upholding arbitration awards. The
court opined that the trial de novo provision thwarted the goals of arbitration of
providing a speedy, informal, and inexpensive forum for resolving controversies
between contracting parties.352
H. Binding Effect of an Award
As a general rule, an arbitrator's decision is final and binding upon the
parties.353 Section 14 of the U.A.A. makes arbitration awards binding by giving
courts limited authority to vacate the awards and by allowing a court order
confirming an award to be enforced just like any other judicial judgment or
decree.354 An award must be binding because no one will arbitrate unless courts
accord proper respect to an arbitrator's decision.
In Mayor of Baltimore v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co.,a55 the court held
that, for arbitration awards to be binding, there must have been notice of
arbitration and a hearing at which evidence was received.356 In this case the
court found that no binding arbitration had taken place because there was no
evidence of arbitration in the record. 57
348. See Harris v. Allied Am. Ins. Co., 152 Il. App. 3d 88, 504 N.E.2d 151 (1987); Allen v.
McCall, 521 So. 2d 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
349. Container Technology v. J. Gadsden Pty., Ltd., 781 P.2d 119 (Colo. App. 1989).
350. 426 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 1988).
351. Id. at 874.
352. Id. at 871, 874.
353. See Melton v. Lyon, 108 N.M. 420,773 P.2d 732 (N.M. 1989); Schnurmacher Holding, Inc.
v. Noriega, 542 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1989); Huntington Woods v. Ajax, Inc., 177 Mich. App. 351, 441
N.W.2d 99 (1989); Eisen v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 352 N.W.2d 731 (Minn. 1984); Foley Co.
v. Grindsted Products, Inc. 233 Kan. 339, 662 P.2d 1254 (1983); Taunton Mun. Light Plant v. Paul
L Gerringer & Assocs., 560 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Mass. 1983), affid mem, 725 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1983);
Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Grudley, 362 N.W.2d 100 (S.D. 1985).
354. U.A.A. § 14.
355. 50 Md. App. 455, 438 A.2d 933 (1982).
356. Id. at 461, 438 A.2d at 937.
357. Id. at 463, 438 A.2d at 938.
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In City of Lenexa v. Fairley Construction Co.,3s8 the court held that an
"agreement to arbitrate did not have to specifically provide that parties agreed to
be bound by arbitrator's decision, as arbitration is, by definition, binding."05
9
I. Collateral Proceedings
In Bertling v. Roadway Express, Inc.,36° the court held that the failure to
utilize the statutory procedure for attacking the validity of an arbitration award
precludes consideration of an attack on the validity of the award in a collateral
proceeding.3 1  In this case, after Bertling was discharged from Roadway, he
filed a grievance. The arbitration panel upheld the discharge, stating that Bertling
was discharged for just cause. Bertling then filed suit in court against Roadway
for retaliatory discharge." 2 Since the issues were substantially the same, the
court found that Bertling's failure to challenge the arbitration award under the
statutory procedure precluded him from challenging the award by means of the
retaliatory discharge proceeding.363
In State v. Thomas Construction Co.,3 4 the court held that an award
confirmed by a court has the same res judicata effect as any judgment.365 The
court noted that the parties are only precluded as to matters that were actually
heard and covered by an award.36
J. Vacation Based on Nonstatutory Grounds
Although courts generally hold that an arbitration award can be vacated only
upon the grounds stated in the U.A.A.,367 occasionally, a court will vacate an
358. 245 Kan. 316, 777 P.2d 851 (1989).
359. Id. at _, 777 P.2d at 851. See also Schmidt v. Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d
870 (Minn. 1988) (arbitrator's decision was binding; trial de novo clause invalid because it violated
public policy favoring arbitration); Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 105 Idaho 36,665
P.2d 1046 (Idaho 1983).
360. 121 II. App. 3d 60, 459 N.E.2d 265 (1984).
361. Id at 64, 459 N.E.2d at 267-68.
362. Id. at 61-62, 459 N.E.2d at 265-66.
363. Id. at 64-65, 459 N.E.2d at 267-68. See also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Arco Alaska, Inc.,
(Westlaw, States Library, Delaware cases file) (1988 W.L. 60380) (When an arbitrator is empowered
by contract to determine the parties' interests, the court shall not actually or constructively vacate or
otherwise supersede the award. If the court allowed this suit, as a practical matter it would have had
the effect of vacating the previous arbitration award; therefore, the court refused to disturb the award
and concluded that to do so would be contrary to the policy that arbitration should be a final
determination).
364. 8 Kan. App. 2d 283, 655 P.2d 471 (1982).
365. Id. at 288, 655 P.2d at 471.
366. Id. at 289, 655 P.2d at 475.
367. UAA § 12. See Harris v. Haught, 435 So. 2d 926 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983); Schnurmacher
Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1989); Container Technology v. J. Gadsden Pty., Ltd.,
781 P.2d 119 (Colo. App. 1989).
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award based on nonstatutory grounds. The most common reason cited by the
court has been on grounds of public policy.
36 s
K. Need for Stating Reasons for Awards
The U.A.A. does not require arbitrators to give reasons for their awards,369
and courts generally do not require arbitrators to justify their decisions.37 °
Rarely is an arbitrator's award vacated for failure to specify or give reasons for
the award.
VIII. MODIFICATION OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
The focus of U.A.A. Section 9371 is the modification, clarification, or
correction of an arbitration award by the arbitrator. This provision allows the
award to be corrected if application by a party is made within twenty days after
delivery of the award. Modification may be made upon the grounds of miscalcu-
lation or mistake under Section 13,372 or in order to clarify the award. The
368. See AFSCME v. Dept. of Corrections, 192 111. App. 3d 108, 548 N.E.2d 592 (1989). Some
courts reason that an award that violates public policy exceeds the authority of the arbitrator, finding
statutory grounds for vacating an award that violates public policy. See Konicki v. Oak Brook Racquet
Club, 110 Il1. App. 3d 217, 441 N.E.2d 1333 (1982). Other courts do not need a statutory ground and
will vacate an award simply because it violates public policy. See Caputo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 344 Pa.
Super. 1, 495 A.2d 959 (1985) (court did not find arbitration award reviewable on specific statutory
grounds but allowed review based on an alleged violation of public policy). See also City of DeKalb
v. Local 1236, 182 IMI. App. 3d 367, 538 N.E.2d 867 (1989).
369. U.A.A. § 12.
370. See Hilltop Const., Inc. v. Lou Apartments, 324 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 1982) (although a trial
court has the authority to order an arbitrator to clarify or explain his reasoning process, the exercise
of that power is purely discretionary); Board of Educ., Unified School District No. 215 v. L.R. Foley
Constr. Co., 237 Kan. 1, 697 P.2d 456 (1985).
371. U.A.A. § 9 states:
On application of a party or, if an application to the court is pending under Sections
11, 12, or 13, on submission to the arbitrators by the court under such conditions as the
court may order, the arbitrators may modify or correct the award upon the grounds stated
in paragraphs (1) and (3) of subdivision (a) of Section 13, or for the purpose of clarifying
the award. The application shall be made within twenty days after delivery of the award
to the applicant. Written notice thereof shall be given forthwith to the opposing party,
stating he must serve his objections thereto, if any, within ten days from the notice. The
award so modified or corrected is subject to the provisions of Sections 11, 12, and 13.
Id.
372. U.A.A. § 13 provides:
(a) Upon application made within ninety days after delivery of a copy of the award to the
applicant, the court shall modify or correct the award where:
(1) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the
description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award;
(2) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and the award may
be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues submitted; or
(3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the
36
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purpose of Section 9 is to allow arbitrators to correct mistakes or clarify awards
without judicial action on the part of either party. This promotes speedy dispute
resolution, a major goal of arbitration. 7
Section 13 concerning modification or correction by the courts has been
strictly applied in confirming awards. In Minnesota Licensed Practical Nurses
Association v. Bemidji Clinic,374 the court held that when an arbitration award
does not specifically state that an individual is entitled to a specific type of relief,
a suit brought to obtain such relief is a modification, not an enforcement, of the
award.3 75 The court refused the request for modification, stating that the award
merely established a procedure for handling employee lay-offs, and did not
specifically state that the plaintiff must be offered full-time work.376
A. Miscalculation of Figures
U.A.A. Section 13(a)(1) allows the court to modify or correct the arbitration
award when an evident miscalculation or mistake occurs.377 In Althoff, Inc. v.
IFG Leasing Co.,378 the court modified an award to increase the amount paid to
a lessor. The arbitrator had erroneously credited an item twice to the lessee in
determining the amount awarded. The court expressed its reluctance to disturb the
award, but held that this was a situation where the U.A.A. required modification
due to an "evident miscalculation of figures."
37 9
Absent such a readily ascertainable mistake, courts are generally reluctant to
disturb the arbitrator's award. A party seeking to modify an unsatisfactory award
in the case of In re Marriage of Gavend80 was denied relief due to the absence
of "mathematical errors [in the award] that would be patently clear to a reviewing
court."38 ' The court stated that the applicant for modification was actually
seeking review of the award's merits, which was not permitted by the Colorado
statute.3a2
controversy.
(b) If the application is granted, the court shall modify and correct the award so as to
effect its intent and shall confirm the award as so modified and corrected. Otherwise, the
court shall confirm the award as made.
(c) An application to modify or correct an award may be joined in the alternative with an
application to vacate the award.
Id.
373. See Red Carpet Armory Realty Co. v. Golden W. Realty, 644 P.2d 93, 94 (Colo. Ct. App.
1982); Saville Int'l Inc. v. Galanti Group, Inc., 107 Ill. App. 3d 799, 802, 438 N.E.2d 509, 512 (1982).
374. 352 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
375. Id. at 67.
376. Id. at 68.
377. UA.A. § 13 (aX1).
378. 704 P.2d 1302 (Wyo. 1985).
379. Id. at 1305.
380. 781 P.2d 161 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
381. Id. at 162.
382. Id. See CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-214 -215 (1987).
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However, at least one court has modified an arbitration award due to an error
in the method of its calculation, rather than due to a mistaken mathematical result.
In Presnell v. Allstate Insurance Co.,383 the court modified an arbitration award
to reflect receipt of insurance proceeds. The court reduced the award by the
amount of the settlement the party had received from the defendant's insurer in
the auto accident.3s
B. Award Upon a Matter Not Submitted
U.A.A. Section 13(a)(2) allows the court to modify or correct an award when
the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them. 85 In
Champion International Corp. v. United Paperworkers International Union,38 6
the union filed a seniority grievance and a scheduling grievance against the
company. Although the union withdrew the seniority grievance prior to the
arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator ruled in favor of the union on this matter.387
On appeal, the court held that since the arbitrator had clearly ruled on a matter not
submitted, modification of the award was required."s In Bernard v. Kuhn,"s9
the parties entered into a compensation stipulation prior to arbitration which
provided that the losing party would pay the arbitrator's fees. The arbitrator,
however, ordered both parties to share the fees, as well as other arbitration costs.
The court held that modification of the award was proper because the issue of
arbitration fees was never submitted to the arbitrator.3 °
C. Award in Conflict with a Statute
A court can modify an arbitration award that conflicts with a state statute.39'
392In Selected Risks Insurance v. Thompson, the trial court modified an arbitra-
tion award that reduced an injured claimant's insurance benefits by the amount of
worker's compensation benefits he had received. The supreme court held that this
reduction was in clear opposition to the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Law,393 which provides that insurance benefits are not subject to
reduction because of worker's compensation received.39  Stating that the
383. 434 N.W.2d 267 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
384. d. at 269.
385. UAA. § 13(aX2).
386. 779 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1985).
387. Id. at 330-31.
388. Id.
389. 65 Md. App. 557, 501 A.2d 480 (1985).
390. Id. at 565-66, 501 A.2d at 484.
391. Upper Bucks County Area Vocational-Technical School Joint Comm'n v. Upper Bucks
County Vocational Technical School Educ. Ass'n, 91 Pa. Commw. 463, 497 A.2d 943 (1985).
392. 520 Pa. 130, 552 A.2d 1382 (1989).
393. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75 § 1735 (Purdon supp. 1990).
394. Selected Risks Ins., 520 Pa. at 142, 552 A.2d at 1388.
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statutory language was a persuasive statement as to legislative policy in dealing
with set-offs, the court modified the award to include the amounts withheld. 395
D. Procedural Issues
A party may be estopped from enforcing a trial de novo provision in an
arbitration agreement where the party previously attempted to modify the award.
In Pierce v. Midwest Family Mutual Insurance Co.,396 Pierce attempted to claim
benefits under the underinsured motorist provision of his automobile insurance
policy. Pursuant to an agreement in the insurance policy, the matter was
submitted to arbitration. After receiving a favorable arbitration award, Pierce
moved to have the trial court confirm the award. Midwest moved to have the trial
court modify the award. The trial court confirmed the arbitration award and
denied Midwest's motion to modify. Midwest then moved for a trial de novo and
vacation of the trial court's judgment. The trial court denied both motions. The
appeals court affirmed the trial court on the ground that Midwest was estopped
from using the trial de novo provision of the policy because it had earlier moved
to modify the award. The appellate court stated that enforcement of the provision
would allow Midwest three opportunities to gain a favorable result: arbitration,
motion to modify or vacate, and trial de novo.3 97 To allow such a result would
hinder what the court referred to as the ultimate purpose of arbitration: "the
voluntary, speedy, informal and relatively inexpensive resolution of disputes."39
IX. TIMELINESS
The U.A.A. provides time limitations for motions to vacate,399 modify,4
and correCt401 an award. If a party to the arbitration fails to challenge the
arbitrator's award within the prescribed statutory period, that party may have
waived its right to object to the award at a later time.402 Jurisdictions that have
adopted the U.A.A. have interpreted these time limits as the point where the court
is obligated to confirm the award if no challenge has been made.4° 3 The courts
395. Id. at 142-43, 552 A.2d at 1388.
396. 390 N.W.2d 358 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
397. Id at 362.
398. Id. at 362-63.
399. Id § 12(b).
400. U.A.A. § 13(a).
401. Id.
402. Walter A. Brown, Inc. v. Moylan, 509 A.2d 98 (D.C. 1986); Sentry Eng'g and Constr., Inc.
v. Mariner's Cay Dev. Corp., 287 S.C. 346, 338 S.E.2d 631 (1985).
403. Dunlap v. State Farm Ins. Co., 377 Pa. Super. 165, 546 A.2d 1209 (1988); Beriker v.
Permagrain Products, Inc., 347 Pa. Super. 102, 500 A.2d 178 (1985). In Pennsylvania, a party may
move the court to confirm an award after expiration of thirty days from the date the award was entered.
The court "shall enter an order confirming the award .... " PA. CONS. STAT. § 7342(b) (1980). The
court in Beriker interpreted the statute as obligating the court to confirm if the award is not challenged
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strictly apply the time limitations set in their state's version of the U.A.A. 4° to
assure efficiency," promote finality,4°  and require parties to promptly initiate
challenges to awards.4°7
A. Motions To Vacate
The U.A.A. requires that an application to vacate an award be made within
ninety days after delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant.' The ninety
day limitation on filing motions to vacate is common to most jurisdictions;4' 9
however a few states have set more stringent time limitations.1
In Orr v. Orr,411 the appellant moved to vacate an award claiming there
were procedural defects in the award. The court denied the motion as untimely
and held that failure to comply with the statutory time limit will result in an
absolute bar, even when the party seeking vacation has a valid reason under the
within thirty days. 347 Pa. Super at 104, 500 A.2d at 179. See also § 11 of the U.A.A. which states
that "[u]pon application of a party, the Court shall confirm an award, unless within the time limits
hereinafter imposed grounds are urged for vacating or modifying or correcting the award, in which case
the court shall proceed as provided in Sections 12 and 13."
404. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. LeMieux, 439 N.W.2d 733, 734 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
("Arbitration awards may be set aside only in limited circumstances and then only if a motion to vacate
is brought within 90 days of receipt on the award.") (quoting MINN STAT. § 572.19(2X1989)); Russell
H. Lankton Constr. Co. v. LaHood, 143 Ill. App. 3d 806, 493 N.E.2d 714(1986); Minnesota Ucensed
Practical Nurses Ass'n v. Bemidji Clinic, 352 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Best Coin-Op, Inc.
v. Clementi, 120 11. App. 3d 892, 458 N.E.2d 1057 (1983).
405. Bell Cold Storage, Inc. v. Over-the-Road City Transfer Union, 673 F. Supp. 987, 991 (D.
Minn. 1987).
406. Great Am. Ins., 439 N.W.2d at 734-35.
407. Haskell v. Forest Land & Timber Co., 408 So. 2d 811, 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
408. U.A.A. § 12(b).
409. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Cabs, Inc., 751 P.2d 61 (Colo. 1988); Walter
A. Brown, Inc. v. Moylan, 509 A.2d 98 (D.C. 1986); Sentry Eng'g and Constr., Inc. v. Mariner's Cay
Dev. Corp., 287 S.C. 346, 338 S.E.2d 631 (1985). See also Ma. REV. STATE. ANN. tit. 14, § 5938(2)
(1964); MINN. STAT. ANN § 572.19(2) (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7-12(B) (1978); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-567.13(b) (1983); TEX. REV. Cv. STAT. ANN. art. 237(B) (Vernon 1973); WYO. STAT. §
1-36-114(b) (1977).
410. The time limit for filing a motion to vacate in Massachusetts is thirty days. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 12(b) (West 1984); Pennsylvania also has a thirty day time limit for filing
motions to vacate. PA. CONS. STAT. § 7342(b) (1980); MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. § 769.9(2) (West
1967) requires that a motion to vacate an award must be made within twenty days.
411. 108 Idaho 874, 702 P.2d 912 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985).
40
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state's arbitration statute to vacate." 2 Other courts also have held that procedur-
al defects must be raised within the statutory time period.41
The ninety day limitation period clearly applies when there is a valid and
enforceable arbitration clause.414 However, the courts have held that even when
the parties submit to arbitration without an arbitration agreement, the parties'
remedy for obtaining review is by moving to vacate the award within the statutory
time limitations.
4 15
The court in Jaffe v. Nocera41 6 would not allow a motion to vacate an
award because the motion was filed more than ten months after the award was
issued. The defendant argued that the statutory time limit would be tolled when
he filed a timely motion for the arbitrator to reconsider the award. The court
stated that tolling might be appropriate where the arbitrators must correct their
own errors before reaching a final judgment, to prevent simultaneous consideration
of the issue by the court on a motion to vacate and by the arbitrator.1 7
However, the court found that none of these situations arose in this case and no
useful purpose would be served by tolling the statute.4t8
In Bernstein v. Grammercy Mills, Inc.,4 19 the Massachusetts Court of
Appeals held that the statutory period for filing a motion to vacate was not tolled
by seeking vacation of the award as a counterclaim to a party's motion to
412. Id at 876, 702 P.2d at 914. See also Burt v. Duval County School Bd., 481 So. 2d 55 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (board waived its right to object to the arbitrator's jurisdiction by not objecting
within ninety days of the arbitrator's award); Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 105
Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (Idaho 1983).
413. See Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts Bay Trans. Auth., 397 Mass.
426, 491 N.E.2d 1053 (1986). In so holding, this court refused to follow the decision in Painters Local
No. 257 v. Johnson Indus. Painting Contractors, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 67, 448 N.E.2d 1307 (1983), which
held that a motion to vacate on jurisdictional grounds was not subject to the time period limitation. In
ruling as it did, the Amalgamated court stated that since the legislature did not establish an exception
to the statutory time limits, this court was not going to create one. 397 Mass. at 431, 491 N.E.2d at
1056.
414. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. LeMieux, 439 N.W.2d 733, 734 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
415. Cady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Idaho 667, 672, 747 P.2d 76, 81 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987); Poire
v. Kaplan, 491 A.2d 529, 534 (D.C. 1985).
416. 493 A.2d 1003 (D.C. Ct. App. 1985).
417. Id. at 1012.
418. Id. The court in Tung v. W.T. Cabe & Co., 492 A.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1985), similarly denied
an application to vacate an award because it was not filed within ninety days of receipt of the award.
The defendant argued that the statutory period for filing such motions was tolled when he filed an
application for reconsideration of the award. The court held that the guidelines did not contain a
procedure for reconsideration of an award and the statutory period was not tolled; see also Best Coin-
Op, Inc. v. Clementi, 120 Ill. App. 3d 892, 458 N.E.2d 1057 (1983) (ninety day statutory period for
filing motion to vacate not tolled by filing a motion for confirmation or by giving responding party
time to file a response to the motion for confirmation).
419. 16 Mass. App. Ct. 403, 452 N.E.2d 231 (1983).
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confirm.4 20 Plaintiff and defendant submitted to arbitration a dispute over a sales
commission defendant claimed plaintiff owed. The arbitrator found in favor of
plaintiff, but the defendant refused to comply with the award. Plaintiff filed a
petition for confirmation and enforcement and defendant counterclaimed to vacate
the award. Plaintiff argued that defendant's counterclaim was untimely because
it was raised more than thirty days after entry of the award. The defendant argued
that his claim was not barred because it was subject to the time limitations under
the statute for compulsory counterclaims. 421 The court held that even if the
defendant's claim was a compulsory counterclaim the state's arbitration act would
control and defendant's claim was untimely.
4 22
Although some courts have held that there should be no judicial exceptions
to these statutory time limitations, 423 there are a few exceptions where courts do
not require a motion to vacate to be filed within ninety days of receipt of the
award. The U.A.A. states that if a party bases its motion to vacate on grounds of
corruption or fraud, the party seeking to vacate has ninety days from the time such
grounds are known or should have been known.424 Also, if the underlying
arbitration proceeding was invalid, at least one court has allowed a party to file
a motion to vacate outside the statutory period.42
The court in Austin v. Stoval1426 held that if an entire award is being
attacked based on a void arbitration proceeding, the motion to vacate need not be
made within the statutory time limits.4 27  Austin and Stovall submitted to
arbitration their dispute over money owed under a subcontract on a construction
project. Stovall did not like the choice of arbitrator and chose another. Austin
refused to participate and the arbitrator entered an award in Stovall's favor. The
district court held that the arbitration proceeding was void due to the incorrect
method of choosing an arbitrator. Austin's failure to timely move to vacate the
award did not preclude him from attacking the award.42
However, in Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Gavin,42 9 the
Michigan Supreme Court held that a court in its discretion may allow a party to
420. But see I.U.B.A.C. Local Union # 31 v. Anastasi Bros., Corp., 600 F. Supp. 92 (S.D. Fla.
1984), where the court permitted defendant to move to vacate an award as a counterclaim even though
not within the statutory time limits, because defendant's claim was based on his allegation that the
contract was illegal. The court reasoned that the validity of the contract must be determined before
either the contract or the arbitration award could be enforced.
421. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 260, § 36 (West Supp. 1984).
422. See Bernstein, 16 Mass. App. Ct. at _, 452 N.E.2d at 235 (section 36 of Mass. arbitration
act is intended to "flush out objection to awards with dispatch").
423. Amalgamated, 397 Mass. at 430, 491 N.F.2d at 1056; Bingham County Comm'n, 105 Idaho
at _...., 665 P.2d at 1049; Haskell, 408 So. 2d at 812.
424. U.AA. § 12(b).
425. Austin v. Stovall, 475 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
426. Id.
427. Id. at 1015.
428. Id.
429. 416 Mich. 407, 331 N.W.2d 418 (1982).
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file an untimely motion to vacate if the party can show excusable neglect. 3 In
this case, the motion was filed three days after the statutory time period had
expired. The court held that since the delay was only three days and the
defendant was not prejudiced thereby, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion
by accepting the late motion.
B. Motions To Modify or Correct
The U.A.A. provides that motions to modify or correct an award be made
within ninety days after delivery of a copy of the award.43 The court in Russell
H. Lankton Construction Co. v. LaHood,432 stated in dicta that characterizing a
complaint as an application for modification will invoke the ninety day statutory
limitations of the state's arbitration act.433 The plaintiff won an arbitration
award which required the defendant to pay the award within fifteen days of
issuance of a Final Certificate of Payment from an Architect. Defendant was not
required to pay until the certificate was issued. The plaintiff filed for judgment
on the award over a year later. The court dismissed the complaint characterizing
it as an untimely motion to modify. 34
In Quirk v. Data Terminal Systems,43 the plaintiff sought to file a motion
to correct and affirm an award which contained a clerical error. The plaintiff
relied on the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure which state that the judge
may correct clerical errors in arbitration awards notwithstanding the time
limitations established in the states arbitration act.436 The court held the motion
was untimely because the statutory time limit had expired and further stated that
since the procedural rule and the statutory time limit were in conflict, the statutory
time limit was more specific and would control. 37
There are a few states which have variations of U.A.A. Section 13(a).
Massachusetts requires that applications for correction or modification be made
within twenty days,4 38 while Pennsylvania requires that all challenges to an
arbitrator's decision be made within thirty days.439
430. Id. at 424-25, 331 N.W.2d at 426.
431. U.A.A. § 13(a).
432. 143 Ill. App. 3d 806, 493 N.E.2d 714 (1986).
433. Id. at 807, 493 N.E.2d at 716.
434. Id.
435. 394 Mass. 334, 475 N.E.2d 1208 (1985).
436. Id. at 339-40, 475 N.E.2d at 1211-12.
437. Id.
438. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 9 (West 1988). See Ciampi v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos.,
26 Mass. App. Ct. 941, 525 N.E.2d 1344 (1988).
439. PA. CONS. STAT. § 7342(b) (1980). See, e.g., Beriker v. Permagrain Products, Inc., 347 Pa.
Super. 102, 104, 500 A.2d 178, 179 (1985).
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C. Motions Demanding Arbitration
The U.A.A. does not provide a time limitation on filing demands for
arbitration. The answer to the question of whether a demand for arbitration is
timely depends on an interpretation of the arbitration agreement. Thus, the general
consensus among courts today is to leave this decision to the arbitrator. 40
The court in Roseville Community School District v. Roseville Federation of
Teachers"1 held that the determination of timeliness is left to the discretion of
the arbitrator, and the court will not reverse the arbitrator's determination. In this
case the issue of timeliness depended on whether the dispute was deemed to be
continuing or temporary in nature. The arbitrator found the grievance to be
continuing and declared that the demand for arbitration was timely. Upon motion
to vacate the award for error in the arbitrator's determination, the court refused to
review the arbitrator's finding, holding that the determination was procedural and
could be made only by the arbitrator. 2
In In re Cameron and Griffith,"3 demand for arbitration was made more
than four years after the dispute arose. Neither the contract in question nor a
statute or court decision of the jurisdiction limited the period within which the
parties could demand arbitration. The court compelled arbitration, stating that the
parties had freely entered into the contract to arbitrate knowing that their dispute
could be settled by arbitrators "according to what was good and equitable."' 4
However, some courts have held that a party may waive its right to compel
arbitration if the party takes action inconsistent with that right."' The court in
Hansen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.'6 found that the
defendant had waived its right to enforce the arbitration clause in the insurance
contract because it had instituted litigation proceedings and engaged in extensive
discovery for eleven months; it was not until it appeared that the suit was not
proceeding in its favor that the defendant sought to compel arbitration."47 The
court stated that arbitration provides a quick and inexpensive litigation alternative,
440. Cameron v. Griffith, 91 N.C. App. 164, 370 S.E.2d 704 (1988); Millwrights Local 548 v.
Robert J. Pugleasa Co., 419 N.W.2d 105 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); County of Durham v. Richards &
Assocs., 742 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. 1984); Roseville Community School Dist. v. Roseville Fed'n of
Teachers, 137 Mich. App. 118, 357 N.W.2d 829 (1984).
441. Rosevile, 137 Mich. App. 118, 357 N.W.2d 829.
442. Id. at 124-25, 357 N.W.2d at 833. See also County of Durham, 742 F.2d at 815 (party
sought to use timeliness as a defense to an action to compel arbitration, and although from the facts
it appeared that the demand was untimely, the court nevertheless compelled arbitration holding that the
determination of whether an action to compel arbitration was timely was reserved to the arbitrator).
443. 91 N.C. App. 164, 370 S.E.2d 704 (1988).
444. Id. at 165, 370 S.E.2d at 705.
445. Falcon Steel Co. v. Weber Eng'g Co., 517 A.2d 281, 288 (Del. Ch. 1986); Hansen v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins, Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974 (Idaho 1987).
446. Hansen, 112 Idaho 663, 735 P. 2d 974.
447. Id. at 665, 735 P.2d at 981.
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and those policies are thwarted when a party seeks to litigate before asserting its
right to arbitration.'
D. Actions to Confirm or Enforce
The U.A.A. does not provide for a specific time period within which to seek
confirmation or enforcement of arbitral awards." 9 Most state statutes similarly
do not provide a time limitation for these actions. Thus, the courts look to
analogous statutes to determine whether actions to confirm or enforce an award
are timely. Two courts have adopted a six month limitation period.45
In United Mine Workers District 4 v. Cyprus Emerald Resources Corp.,
451
the union sought to enforce the arbitrator's award against Cyprus. The court, after
recognizing that Pennsylvania's version of the U.A.A. does not specify a time
limitation period for enforcement of actions, held that the National Labor Relations
Act's (NLRA) six month statute of limitations 4 2 applied. 3 The court found
that no state statute was sufficiently analogous and turned to federal law,
concluding that this action was similar to actions brought under the NLRA.454
Similarly, the court in Walkerville Education Association v. Walkerville Rural
Communities School455 had to locate an applicable statutory time limitation to
apply to actions seeking enforcement of an arbitration award. The Michigan court
adopted the six month period found in the Public Employment Relations Act
(PERA).45' Although actions filed under PERA are not exactly analogous to
actions to enforce an award, the court held that this statute was the best of any
other statute it could have chosen, and that in using the six month period set out
in PERA the court would be furthering the state's policy favoring the prompt
resolution of labor disputes. 45
7
E. Appeals
The U.A.A. does not provide any time limitations for filing an appeal.458
U.A.A. Section 19(b) merely says that "[t]he appeal shall be taken in the manner
448. Id.
449. U.A.A. § 11 only states that "[u]pon application of a party, the Court shall confirm an award
450. See United Mine Workers Dist. 4 v. Cyprus Emerald Resources Corp., 681 F. Supp. 271
(W.D. Pa. 1988); Walkerville Educ. Ass'n v. Walkerville Rural Communities School, 165 Mich. App.
341, 418 N.W.2d 459 (1987).
451. United Mine Workers, 681 F. Supp. 271.
452. As found in § 10(b) of the NLRA.
453. United Mine Workers, 681 F. Supp. at 277.
454. Id. at 275-77.
455. Walkerville, 165 Mich. App. 341, 418 N.W.2d 459.
456. Id. at 345, 418 N.W.2d at 461.
457. Id.
458. See UAA § 19.
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and to the same extent as from orders or judgments in a civil action." Therefore,
any statutory time limitations will have to be incorporated into each state's own
version of the U.A.A.. At least two jurisdictions have enacted statutory time
periods within which a party must appeal an arbitrator's award." 9
In Farmer v. Polen, ° the plaintiff received an arbitration award against
the defendant and sought to have the award confirmed. The defendant filed a
counterclaim for breach of contract. When the trial court denied the counterclaim,
the defendant filed an amended answer to the petition seeking to rescind the
contract. The trial court denied confirmation, but the appellate court reversed,
holding that the defendant, by failing to challenge the validity of either the
arbitration agreement or the subsequent arbitration proceedings within the ninety
day statutory time limit, was deemed to have ratified and confirmed the
contract. 461
However, the Florida Supreme Court has held that this ninety day statutory
period on filing appeals from arbitration awards applies only to issues that were
submitted to the arbitration panel. 62 The defendant in Meade v. Lumbermens
Mutual 63 was an insurance carrier who sought to appeal the award because it
exceeded the policy limits. The trial court denied the appeal because the insurance
carrier had filed it outside the ninety day statutory time period. The appellate
court reversed, stating that the insurance company's defense had not been
presented to the arbitration panel, and therefore, the ninety day statutory period did
not apply.'
In Lough v. Spring, 5 the court held that the appeal filed by appellants for
a trial de novo twenty-nine days after the dissolution of the court order staying the
appeal period was untimely. In Pennsylvania, a party to a compulsory arbitration
may appeal the arbitrator's award by seeking a trial de novo in the court of
common pleas;66 however, the appeal must be taken within thirty days after
entry of the award. 7 The superior court held that the court of common pleas
did not have the power to stay the appeal period while the court was considering
a motion to strike, and the stay entered by the court of common pleas had no
effect on the time for filing the appeal.468
459. Florida requires that appeals be filed within ninety days. See Farmer v. Polen, 423 So. 2d
1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Meade v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 423 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1982).
Pennsylvania requires appeals to be filed within thirty days. See, e.g., Lough v. Spring, 383 Pa. Super.
85, 556 A.2d 441 (1989).
460. 423 So. 2d 1035.
461. Id. at 1037.
462. See Meade, 423 So. 2d at 910.
463. 423 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1982).
464. Id. at 909.
465. 383 Pa. Super. 85, 556 A.2d 441 (1989).
466. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7361(d) (Purdon 1980).
467. Lough, 556 A.2d at 442 (citing PA. R. Civ. P. 1308(a). See also Hall v. Reeb, 555 A.2d 926
(Pa. Super. 1989).
468. Lough, 556 A.2d at 444-45.
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In Seay v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co.,469 a procedural
conflict arose between two Pennsylvania U.A.A. statutes concerning the
commencement of the limitations period for appealing an arbitrator's award.470
Prudential appealed an order denying its petition to vacate the arbitrator's award.
The court quashed the order because final judgment had not been entered. When
Seay's petition to confirm the arbitrator's award was granted, Prudential appealed
again. The court quashed this appeal because it was filed more than thirty days
after the order confirming the award. In recognizing the equivocation in the
statutes (one permits an appeal from an order confirming an award and from final
judgment47' while the other requires final judgment to be entered for orders
confirming awards),472 the court determined that these two statutes should be
read together and held that an order confirming an award must be reduced to
judgment before it may be appealed. 473 Thus, Prudential's appeal was timely
since it was filed within thirty days from final judgment of the order.4 74
F. Federal Causes of Action
Two federal appellate circuits have held that the ninety day limitation period
is inapplicable to collective bargaining agreements: the Tenth Circuit in Barnett
v. United Airlines,475 and the Eleventh Circuit in Hand v. International Chemical
Workers Union.476 These two cases relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters 77 in applying the statute
of limitations found in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), rather than the
corresponding statutory time limitations provided in the state's arbitration act.
In DelCostello, the Court applied the six month limitations period found in
Section 10(b) of the NLRA to a Section 301 dispute. The court claimed that
important federal policies were at stake, and the NLRA was more analogous to the
Section 301 dispute than the applicable forum's arbitration act.
However, in a series of later decisions, the courts have applied the statutory
limitations found in the U.A.A. to disputes involving Section 301 of the National
Labor Management Relations Act (NLMRA).4 7' These subsequent decisions
distinguished DelCostello and narrowed the holding's application to its facts.479
469. 375 Pa. Super. 37, 543 A.2d 1166 (1988).
470. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7316 -7320 (Purdon 1980).
471. Id. § 7320(a).
472. Id. § 7316.
473. Seay, 375 Pa. Super. 37, 543 A.2d 1166.
474. Id. at 41, 543 A.2d at 1168.
475. 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1984).
476. 712 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1983).
477. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
478. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 -97 (1982). See, e.g., Gencorp, Inc. v. Local 850, United Rubber, 622 F.
Supp. 216 (W.D.N.C. 1985); Plumber's Pension Fund, Local 130 v. Domas, 778 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir.
1985).
479. Delcostello, 462 U.S. 151.
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The court in Plumber's Pension Fund, Local 130, U.A. v. Domas480 resolved the
dispute by applying the statutory limitations contained in Illinois' arbitration
act." 1 The court relied on the language used in DelCostello to distinguish the
decision. The Supreme Court in DelCostello expressly stated that the case "should
not be taken as a departure from prior practice in borrowing limitations periods
for federal causes of action, in labor law or elsewhere." 482
The federal district court in Gencorp, Inc. v. Local 850, United Rubber"3
held that U.A.A. Section 12(b) applies to disputes involving Section 301 of the
NLMRA. Gencorp sought to vacate the arbitration award in federal court on the
ground that the arbitrator failed to consider certain evidence Gencorp had offered.
The court, noting that no federal statute of limitations applies to Section 301,
stated that "the timeliness of such a suit is to be governed by the most closely
analogous statute of limitations under state law. "48 The court held that since
the U.A.A.4 5 provides for vacating an award on the grounds that the arbitrator
failed to hear evidence material to the dispute, the U.A.A. would be the most
analogous statute to apply in this case.
X. JUDGMENTS ON AWARDS
A. Judgment on Award Entered by a Court
Section 14 of the U.A.A. provides that once a court enters a judgment or
decree confirming, modifying, or correcting an award, this judgment shall be
enforced in the same manner as any other court order."7 Therefore, res judicata
applies to judgments entered on arbitration awards48 and to an arbitrator's final
480. Plumber's Pension, 778 F.2d 1266.
481. Cf Ozite Corp. v. Upholsterers Int'l Union, 671 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (ninety day
period in Illinois U.A.A. inapplicable; plaintiff filed a motion to compel; court stated that U.A.A.
pertained to suits to vacate awards and no arbitration had occurred here yet).
482. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 166. See also Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No. 20 v. Baylor
Heating and Air Conditioning Inc., 688 F. Supp. 462 (S.D. Ind. 1988), affd, 877 F.2d 547 (7th Cir.
1989) (court borrowed ninety day statutory time limit from Indiana's U.A.A. to determine timeliness
of an action under NLM.RA).
483. Gencorp., 622 F. Supp. 216.
484. Id. at 218.
485. U.A.A. § 12(a)(4).
486. Gencorp, 622 F. Supp. at 217.
487. UA. § 14 states:
Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying, or correcting an award,
judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity therewith and be enforced as any other
judgment or decree. Costs of the application and of the proceedings subsequent thereto,
and disbursements may be awarded by the court.
Id.
488. Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 76 N.C. App. 16, 331 S.E.2d 726 (1985), reh'g denied,
315 N.C. 590, 341 S.E.2d 29 (1986).
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award." 9 Furthermore, when a claim is properly adjudicated in arbitration, the
pursuit of the same issue on a different theory is barred.490 The application of
res judicata and collateral estoppel to arbitrator's decisions emphasizes the finality
of the arbitration process. Since a major purpose of arbitration is to avoid
litigation, if dissatisfied parties were allowed to successfully appeal or relitigate
the confirmation of the award, this goal would be defeated.
However, in Sieberlich v. Burlington Northern Railroad,49' the court vacated
an arbitration award although the party seeking vacation had not appealed the
arbitrator's decision within the 20-day period dictated by local court rules. Stating
that the Minnesota statute 9 2 regarding vacation of judgments governs over a
local court rule, the appellate court confirmed the lower court's vacation of the
award. Burlington Northern's attorney stated that he believed the arbitration was
non-binding; therefore, he failed to realize he had only 20 days to appeal the
award. The court held that this constituted "excusable neglect" under the state
statute concerning vacation of judgments and allowed the untimely trial de novo
request.493
B. Prejudgment Interest
Although courts are generally unlikely to approve prejudgment interest in an
arbitration award,494 the Supreme Court of New Mexico held in Hooten Construc-
tion Co. v. Borsberry Construction Co. 4 95 that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding prejudgment interest.4 9" Borsberry had argued that
prejudgment interest was not allowable because no contract provision authorized
it, and two settlement offers had been made before the arbitration.497 The court
rejected these arguments, stating that the New Mexico arbitration statute 498
specifically allowed the court to award interest after considering several factors,
including, but not limited to, whether or not settlement offers had been ten-
dered. 499 Furthermore, when the contract does not preclude interest, as in the
489. Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gridley, 362 N.W.2d 100 (S.D. 1985).
490. Save Charleston Found. v. Murray, 286 S.C. 170, 333 S.E.2d 60 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985).
491. 447 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
492. MINN. R. Civ. P. 60.02 (1988).
493. Sieberlich, 447 N.W.2d at 898.
494. See Coughlan Constr. Co. v. Town of Rockport, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 994, 505 N.E.2d 203
(1987); Arbitration of Wisniewski, 403 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 1987); Lucas v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
403 N.W.2d 646 (Minn. 1987); Wanschura v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 389 N.W.2d 927 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986); Hedlund v. Citizen's Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. of Red Wing, 377 N.W.2d 460 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985).
495. 108 N.M. 192, 769 P.2d 726 (N.M. 1986).
496. Id. at _, 769 P.2d at 730.
497. Id.
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instant case, the award of prejudgment interest remains within the court's
discretion.5s°
C. Attorney Fees
Section 10 of the U.A.A. specifically excludes attorney fees from the list of
expenses an arbitrator may award in the absence of a provision in the agreement
to arbitrate. 5 1 Therefore, the court in Bingham County Commission v. Interstate
Electric Co.s"2 held that the plain meaning of Section 10 precludes the award of
attorney fees in an arbitration award without the parties' consent.503 However,
some courts have allowed recovery of attorney fees under U.A.A. Section 14 when
such expenses are incurred in proceedings to confirm, modify or correct an
award.5 '3  Attorney fees incurred prior to and during arbitration are not recover-
able. 50 5 Arbitrators are not authorized to award attorney fees because they do
not have the expertise necessary to determine the appropriate compensation, but
a court may award attorney fees to the successful party in arbitration."°  A
court's awarding attorney fees is appropriate when the party becomes entitled to
judgment in its favor.507
In Leaf v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 0 8 the court held
that when action to compel arbitration of insurance claims is reasonably necessary
to pursue the claim rather than to resort to litigation, award of attorney fees is
justified.5°  The insured, in Leaf had advised State Farm of her decision to
arbitrate a disputed claim rather than to litigate. When State Farm failed to
respond the court held that this constituted "reasonable necessity" on the insured's
part to resort to litigation to pursue her claim.51 0 Therefore, since it was within
500. Id.
501. U.A.A. § 10 reads: "Unless otherwise provided in the agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrators'
expenses and fees, together with other expenses, not including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct
of the arbitration, shall be paid as provided in the award." Id.
502. 105 Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (Idaho 1983).
503. Id. See also Mirabella v. Safeway Ins. Co., 114 IlL. App. 3d 680, 449 N.E.2d 258 (1983).
504. County of Clark v. Blanchard Constr. Co., 98 Nev. 488, 653 P.2d 1217 (1982). But see
Heyman v. Vonelli, 413 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (recoverable expenses limited to court
costs).
505. Bingham County, 105 Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046; see also St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.
v. Sample, 533 So. 2d 1196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.). But see LH. Airco v. Rapistan Corp., 446 N.W.2d
376 (1989) (court stated an exception to the rule that a party cannot recover attorney fees from prior
arbitration proceedings when prior litigation expenses were occasioned by wrongful conduct of a non-
party, and a subsequent action to recover attorney fees is maintained).
506. Zac Smith & Co. v. Moonspinner Condominium Ass'n, 472 So. 2d 1324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
507. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Stack, 543 So. 2d 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
508. 544 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
509. Id. at 1050.
510. Id.
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the company's power to resolve the conflict and they failed to do so, Leaf was
entitled to a reasonable attorney fee award. 1'
When a contractual arbitration clause expressly contains a provision
authorizing recovery of attorney fees, this language must be strictly construed."1 2
The court in B & H Construction Co. v. Tallahassee Community College1 3 held
that recovery of these contractual fees are not part of damages, which are subject
to the mitigation principle, but rather are ancillary to damages.31 4 The appellate
court further stated that the trial court has discretion to deny the contractual
attorney fees if the party seeking reimbursement is unsuccessful on the merits of
the claim."
Another approach courts have taken is to examine the nature of the dispute
and the underlying statutory provisions which would be available in a court
proceeding on the particular dispute. 16 This is in keeping with Section 14 of
the U.A.A., which suggests that an arbitration award should be treated in an
identical manner as a judicial decree. 17 A party cannot be expected to forego
judicial recourse and agree to arbitrate a dispute if it will not be eligible for
similar relief, including an award of attorney fees, in both proceedings. In
Consolidated Labor Union Trust v. Clark,s1 8 the court allowed recovery of
attorney fees when the issue arbitrated was a claim for benefits under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).51 9 Although the award of
fees under ERISA conflicted with the Florida Arbitration Code,520 which
expressly excluded recovery of attorney fees, the court concluded that the nature
of the underlying complaint governed. Therefore, the award of attorney fees
pursuant to ERISA was affirmed.
However, an excessive award of attorney fees may be stricken on appeal. In
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Sample,52' the trial court awarded
fees of $30,000 to the insured's attorney, although the total award to the insured
was only $19,230.77.22 Since the parties had previously entered into a 40%
511. Id.
512. B & H Constr. Co. v. Tallahassee Community College, 542 So. 2d 382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
513. Id.
514. Id. at 389; see also Geisler v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 556 A.2d 391, 398 (1989) (attorney
fees awarded as part of a settlement did not constitute an award for bodily damages, which required
set-off from policy limits.)
515. B & H Constr., 542 So. 2d at 387.
516. Consolidated Labor Union Trust v. Clark, 498 So. 2d 547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
517. UA.A. § 14.
518. 498 So. 2d 547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
519. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1974).
520. FLA. STAT. § 682.11 (1981).
521. 533 So. 2d 1196.
522. Id. at 1197.
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Section 19 of the U.A.A. denotes those orders upon which an appeal may be
taken. Many jurisdictions have enacted statutes that have appeals provisions
identical or similar to Section 19 of the U.A.A.. The courts within these states
generally construe this list of appeals to be exclusive, and any order not listed is
not appealable.524 For those states who do not view this list of appealable orders
as exhaustive, the appealability of an order is determined based on its similarity
to an injunction or on whether the particular order is deemed final.525
A. Orders Compelling Arbitration
The U.A.A. does not expressly allow an appeal from an order compelling
arbitration. 26 Most jurisdictions that have adopted the U.A.A. also hold that no
right to appeal exists from an order compelling arbitration.5 27  Two reasons
given for not allowing these orders to be appealed are the policy of encouraging
arbitration and the promotion of uniformity in the laws of those states which adopt
the U.A.A..
The Arkansas Supreme Court recently decided Chem-Ash, Inc. v. Arkansas
Power & Light.5" Chem-Ash argued that the order was appealable under Rule
2(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure.529 The court held that an
order compelling arbitration did not fit within the rule and, therefore, was not
appealable.530  In arriving at its conclusion, the court stated that if it was to
allow an appeal from every order compelling arbitration, it would be frustrating
the policy favoring arbitration.53'
523. Id.
524. J.M. Huber v. Main-Erbauer, Inc., 493 A.2d 1048 (Me. 1985); St. Francis Xavier Hosp. v.
Ruscon/Abco, 285 S.C. 584, 330 S.E.2d 548 (1985); Gardner v. Prudential Ins. Co., 332 Pa. Super.
358, 481 A.2d 654 (1984); Old Rochester Regional Teachers' Club v. Old Rochester Regional School
Dist., 18 Mass. App. Ct. 117,463 N.E.2d 581 (1984); Hodes v. Comprehensive Health Assocs., 9 Kan.
App. 2d 36, 670 P.2d 76 (1983).
525. E.g., Grane v. Grane, 130 IMl. App. 3d 332, 337-38, 473 N.E.2d 1366, 1370 (Ill. Ct. App.
1985).
526. See U.A.A. § 19(a).
527. Eckblad v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 371 N.W.2d 78 (Minn. C. App. 1985); Burgie v. League
Gen. Ins. Co., 355 N.W.2d 466 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Gardner, 332 Pa. Super. 358, 481 A.2d 654;
Schmidt v. Clothier, 338 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1983).
528. 296 Ark. 83, 751 S.W.2d 353 (1988).
529. Id. at 84, 751 S.W.2d at 354.
530. Id.
531. Id.
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Bluffs, Inc. v. Wysocki532 held that
an order compelling arbitration was not appealable. The court could find no basis
outside the U.A.A. for allowing the appeal and dismissed the appeal.533
There are a few jurisdictions that have either not adopted Section 19 or that
have found ways to allow an appeal from an order compelling arbitration. 534 In
Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp. v. Evansville Teachers Association,535 the
Indiana Court of Appeals held an order compelling arbitration to be appeal-
able.536 The policy reason stated behind its decision was that if the court
withheld the right to appeal these orders, it would be counter-productive to compel
parties to proceed with useless arbitration proceedings.
5 37
B. Orders Staying Arbitration Proceedings
Section 19 of the U.A.A. allows an appeal from an order granting an
application to stay arbitration. 538 Those jurisdictions that have adopted the
U.A.A. also allow such an appeal.539  Although the case did not involve an
arbitration agreement, the court in Anthony Plumbing v. Attorney General4 °
mentioned in dicta that an appeal may be taken from an order granting a petition
to stay arbitration.541
532. 68 N.C. App. 284, 286, 314 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1984).
533. Id.
534. Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corp. v. Evansville Teachers Ass'n, 494 N.E.2d 321 (Ind.
App. 1986); Board of Educ. v. Indian Prairie Educ. Ass'n, 13 I11. App. 3d 1040, 487 N.E.2d 1149
(1985); County of Durham v. Richards & Assocs., 742 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. 1984).
535. Evansville-Vanderburgh, 494 N.E.2d 321.
536. Id. at 323.
537. Id. at 325 (citing IND. R. APP. P. 4(BX6)).
538. Provided that the order is made under Section § 2(b) of the U.AA., which states:
On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding commenced or
threatened on a showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate. Such an issue, when in
substantial and bona fide dispute, shall be forthwith and summarily tried and the stay
ordered if found for the moving party. If found for the opposing party, the court shall
order the parties to proceed to arbitration.
iat
539. J.M. Huber, 493 A.2d 1048; Manalili v. Commercial Mowing & Grading, 442 So. 2d 411
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); J & K Cement Constr. Inc. v. Montalbano Builders, Inc., 119 II. App. 3d
663, 456 N.E.2d 889 (1983).
540. 298 Md. 11, 467 A.2d 504 (1983).
541. Maryland's arbitration statute does not list any other arbitration order or judgments as
specifically appealable. See MD. CS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to -234 (1980).
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C. Orders Denying the Compulsion of Arbitration
Ordinarily, an interlocutory order is not appealable because it is not a final
order. However, the U.A.A. specifically allows a party to appeal an order denying
the compulsion of arbitration. s42
Most states which have adopted Section 19 of the U.A.A. also allow an
appeal to be taken from an order denying the compulsion of arbitration.543 The
Kansas Court of Appeals in Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Kansas Power & Light
Co.5" held that even though an order denying an application to compel arbitra-
tion would be an unappealable interlocutory order under Kansas statutory law,
545
such an order is subject to interlocutory appeal.546 The court in this case held
that the Kansas U.A.A. overrides the conflicting Kansas statute.547
Although Illinois has not enacted Section 19 of the U.A.A., the courts have
found a way to allow appeal of orders denying compulsion. In J & K Cement
Construction v. Montalbano Builders, Inc.5  and Notaro v. Nor-Evan Corp.,
5 49
the Illinois courts analogized the denial of a motion to compel arbitration to the
denial of an injunction.550 The court in J & K Cement held that the policy of
the U.A.A. favors arbitration, and this policy would be frustrated if the courts
were not allowed to enforce arbitration agreements.551
There are limited situations where courts have been unwilling to allow
appeals from orders denying the compulsion of arbitration. In NCR Corp. v. Mr.
Penguin Tuxedo Rental, Inc.,52 the court held that an arbitration agreement was
not binding on the parties; therefore, the provisions for interlocutory appeals did
not apply.553 The court then dismissed the appeal stating that it could find no
justification outside the U.A.A. for allowing the appeal.554
542. U.AA § 19(aX1).
543. U.S. Insulation v. Hilro Constr. Co., 146 Ariz. 250, 705 P.2d 490 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1985);
Servomation Corp. v. Hickory Constr. Co., 70 N.C. App. 309, 318 S.E.2d 904 (1984), affid after
remand, 74 N.C. App. 603,328 S.E.2d 842 (1985), rev'd, 316 N.C. 543, 342 S.E.2d 853 (1986); Blow
v. Shaugnessy, 68 N.C. App. 1, 313 S.E.2d 868 (1984); Manalili v. Commercial Mowing & Grading,
442 So. 2d 411 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Bloom, 386 So. 2d 286
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Sabates v. Int'l Medical Centers, Inc., 450 So. 2d 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984); Gardner v. Prudential Ins. Co., 332 Pa. Super. 358, 481 A.2d 654 (1984).
544. 12 Kan. App. 2d 546, 751 P.2d 146 (1988).
545. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-418 (1986).
546. Kansas Gas & Elec., 12 Kan. App. 2d at __, 751 P.2d at 149-50.
547. Id.
548. 119 IMI. App. 3d 663, 456 N.E2d 889 (1983).
549. 98 I11. App. 2d 268, 456 N.F.2d 93 (1983).
550. An appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving,
or refusing to dissolve an injunction under IL. R. Ctv. P. 307(aX).
551. J & K Cement, 119 11. App. 3d at 681, 456 N.E.2d at 902.
552. 663 S.W.2d 107 (rex. Ct. App. 1984).
553. Id. at 108.
554. Id.
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D. Orders Denying a Stay of Arbitration
Jurisdictions that have adopted the U.A.A. have not allowed appeals to be
taken from orders denying a stay of arbitration.5 5 The court in J.M. Huber
Corp. v. Main-Erbauer, Inc.,556 denied an appeal from a denial of a stay of
arbitration because there was no provision for such an appeal in the Maine
arbitration statute. 5 7 The court stated that the limitations imposed by Section
19 of the U.A.A. and the corresponding Maine statute55 encouraged the use of
arbitration and avoided delays caused by unnecessary interlocutory appeals.559
A Kansas court adopted a similar philosophy in Hodes Comprehensive Health
Associates"W by stating that "the fact the legislature saw fit to specify in one
code section the different orders and judgments from which appeals may be taken
clearly indicates.., an intention to restrict the appeals in such proceedings to the
orders and judgments therein specified. 561
Those jurisdictions that have not adopted Section 19 of the U.A.A. are more
likely to allow an appeal on the ground that the denial of a right to appeal in such
a situation denies a party the right to a full opportunity to challenge the existence
of a valid arbitration agreement.562 The Illinois court decided the cases of Grane
v. Grane5 63 and Clark v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.5A in the same year.
Each case held that an order denying a stay of arbitration was appealable. Illinois
has not adopted Section 19 and, therefore, has no statutory list of appealable
orders. Illinois allows an appeal of an arbitration award as it would an appeal in
any civil case. The court in Grane held that the order denying a stay of
arbitration was similar to an order granting or denying an injunction and
appealable under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. Section
1292(a)(1). The court in Clark, also holding that the order was injunctive in
nature, relied on Illinois case law allowing such appeals.
565
555. J.M. Huber, 493 A.2d 1048; St. Frances Xavier Hosp., 285 S.C. Ct. App. 584, 330 S.E.2d
548; Hodes, 9 Kan. App. 2d 36, 670 P.2d 76.
556. 493 A.2d 1048 (Me. 1985).
557. The pertinent Maine statute is identical to U.A.A. § 19.
558. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 5945(1)(B) (1964).
559. JM. Huber, 493 A.2d at 1050.
560. 9 Kan. App. 2d 36, 670 P.2d 76 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983).
561. Id. at _, 670 P.2d at 78.
562. See, e.g., Grane v. Grane, 130 IlL. App. 3d 332, 339, 473 N.E.2d 1366, 1370-71 (1985).
563. 130 Ill. App. 3d 332, 473 N.E.2d 1366.
564. 131 I11. App. 3d 633, 476 N.E.2d 4 (1985).
565. Id. See, e.g., Sefren v. Board of Trustees of Addison Fire Protection Dist., 60 I11. App. 3d
813, 816-17, 377 N.E.2d 341, 343-44 (11. App. Ct. 1978).
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E. Appeals From an Award
Section 19 of the U.A.A. also allows an appeal to be taken from (1) an order
confirming or denying confirmation of an award;' (2) an order modifying or
correcting an award;.6 (3) an order vacating an award without directing a
rehearing; s68 and (4) a judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of
this act. 69
The court in Rural Water District No. 6 Butler County v. Ziegler Corp.
57 0
granted the District's motion to confirm the arbitration award. Ziegler appealed
this order but the appellate court affirmed the trial court's confirmation, holding
that even though the right to appeal is statutorily given, the scope of review of an
award is severely limited.7
In Metropolitan Airports Commission v. Airports Police Federation,72 the
arbitrator interpreted a collective bargaining agreement between the Metropolitan
Airports Commission and the Metropolitan Airports Police Federation and found
that the assignment of work, which was the subject of their dispute, was not
covered by the agreement. Therefore, the grievance was not arbitrable. Finding
the arbitrator had exceeded his powers, the district court vacated the arbitrator's
award and remanded the matter for rehearing by another arbitrator. The
Minnesota Supreme Court held that an order which vacated an award, but also
ordered a rehearing, was not appealable because it did not fall within Minnesota's
arbitration act. 73 However, the court continued to hold that regardless of
whether the judgment was appealable under the state's arbitration act, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court have the authority
to accept the appeal if the "interests of justice so warrant." ' *
In Western Waterproofing Co. v. Lindenwood Colleges7" the Missouri
Court of Appeals held that an order denying a petition to vacate an arbitration
award is not an appealable order. 76 However, the court read the appeal from
the denial of the motion to vacate as a premature appeal from the order confirming
566. U.A.A. § 19(aX3).
567. Id. § 19(aX4).
568. Id. § 19(aX5).
569. Id. § 19(a)(6).
570. 9 Kan. App. 2d 305, 677 P.2d 573 (1984).
571. Id. at __, 677 P.2d at 578. See also Caputo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 344 Pa. Super. 1, 495 A.2d
959 (1985).
572. 443 N.W.2d 519 (Minn. 1989).
573. MINN. STAT. § 572.26.1(5) (1990).
574. Metro. Airports Comm'n, 443 N.W.2d at 523.
575. 662 S.W.2d 288 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
576. Id. at 289. See also Dunlap v. State Farm Ins. Co., 377 Pa. Super. 165, 546 A.2d 1209
(1988) (no right to appeal from denial of motion to vacate exists under Pennsylvania's arbitration act;
however, court is obligated to confirm award if there are no motions to modify or correct, and it is the
order confirming the award that can be appealed).
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the award, which is appealable in Missouri. 7  Since, in the area of arbitration,
it is difficult to determine when a judgment is final, the court allowed the appeal.
The court reasoned that under Rule 81.05(b) of the Missouri Rules of Court, when
an a notice of appeal has been filed prematurely, such notice will be considered
to have been filed immediately after the judgment becomes final.57 8 Here the
court treated the appeal as a good faith effort to appeal the confirmation of the
award.7 9
F. Procedure
Appeals permitted under the U.A.A. must be taken in the same manner as
appeals from civil actions.s8  In Haegele v. Pennsylvania General Inc. Co.,s 1'
the trial court denied defendant's motion to vacate or modify the award. The
plaintiff argued that since defendant did not file any objections to the judge's
order, the defendant had not preserved any issues for appeal. The defendant
argued, and the court agreed, that the proceeding before the court on the motion
to vacate or modify was similar to a hearing on a petition and not a bench trial,
and was therefore exempt from the rule requiring any objections to be filed within
ten days. Basing its decision on Pennsylvania's U.A.A.,s82 the court held that
an appeal from a court's order concerning an arbitral award shall be by petition
and must follow the same procedure as an appeal from a hearing in a civil
action.""
The case of McGonigle v. Currence" established the rule that a party's
appearance at the arbitration hearing is not a requirement in perfecting an appeal.
McGonigle appealed from an order dismissing a de novo appeal from an
arbitrator's award. The trial court dismissed the de novo appeal for failure to
appear at the arbitration hearing. The superior court reversed, stating that Section
7361(d) grants any party the right to appeal for a trial de novo in the court,
provided they comply with all the necessary steps in perfecting the appeal, and
appearance at the arbitration hearing is not such a step.85
577. Western Waterproofing, 662 S.W.2d at 289 (construing Mo. REv. STAT. § 435.440 (Supp.
1986)). See Burgie v. League Gen. Ins. Co., 355 N.W.2d 466, 468-69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (trial
court's denial of motion to vacate acted as conftrmation of award and was, therefore, immediately
appealable); Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M. LaFave Co., 67 N.C. App. 278, 312 N.C. 224, 321
S.E.2d 872 (1984) (court allowed interlocutory appeal from confirmation of award even though other
issues remained to be adjudicated, holding that by allowing an immediate appeal, court could avoid
risk of inconsistent holdings).
578. Western Waterproofing, 662 S.W.2d at 289.
579. Id.
580. U.A.A. § 19(b).
581. 330 Pa. Super. 481, 479 A.2d 1005 (1984).
582. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7317 (1980).
583. Haelele, 330 Pa. Super. at 490, 479 A.2d at 1009.
584. 387 Pa. Super 511, 564 A.2d 508 (1989).
585. Id. at 517, 564 A.2d at 511.
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XII. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Jurisdiction
While arbitration is a non-judicial proceeding, the U.A.A. authorizes limited
judicial involvement to facilitate its goals. Jurisdiction lies with the courts of
competent jurisdiction in the state. 86 Generally, courts are permitted to
determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists58 7 and to enforce 88 an
agreement by compelling arbitration or, where appropriate, by staying arbitration
or judicial proceedings. 9
Once the award is made, the court may confirm,590 correct, modify, 9' or
vacate592 the award. When it has granted an order confirming, correcting or
modifying an award, the court enters judgment in conformity therewith.
593
In proceedings to confirm, modify or vacate awards, courts rule upon a
variety of issues raised by the parties. Courts generally rule on the arbitrability
of the claim, although that responsibility may, in limited instances, be shifted to
a state administrative agency or board.5" The issue of waiver of the right to
compel arbitration is to be determined by a court, not an arbitrator,5 9 as is the
res judicata effect of a prior arbitration award. 596 In Pennsylvania, a court may
rule upon constitutional attacks upon an arbitrator's award. 97 A court may also
have the power under a state's arbitration act to review an arbitration award
rendered pursuant to a state law which prohibits review. 598
An agreement to arbitrate confers jurisdiction upon the courts to enforce the
agreement and to enter judgment. In Bingham County Commission v. Interstate
Electric Co.,5 9 the Idaho Supreme Court held that the arbitrator's award was not
itself the judgment of a competent tribunal and that it became enforceable only
when the court entered judgment thereon.
586. UAA. § 17.
587. Id § 2(a).
588. Id. § 17.
589. Id. § 2.
590. Id. § 11.
591. Id. § 13.
592. Id. § 12.
593. Id. § 14.
594. Board of Educ. for Dorchester County v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 506 A.2d 625 (1986);
Guaranty Nat. Ins. Co. v. Valdez, 107 N.M. 764, 764 P.2d 1322 (N.M. 1988).
595. Joba Constr. Co. v. Monroe County Drain Comm'r, 150 Mich. App. 173, 388 N.W.2d 251
(1986).
596. Monmouth Publ. Schools, Dist. No. 38 v. Pullen, 141 Ill. App. 3d 60, 489 N.E.2d 1100
(1985); LR. Foy Constr. Co. v. Pro. Mechanical Constr., 13 Kan. App. 2d 188, 766 P.2d 196 (1988).
597. Pennsylvania Social Servs. Union v. Commonwealth of Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 96
Pa. Commw. 461, 508 A.2d 360 (1986).
598. Appeal of Upper Providence Police Lodge, 93 Pa. Commw. 272, 502 A.2d 263 (1985).
599. 108 Idaho 181, 697 P.2d 1195 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983).
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. The arbitration agreement itself is the source of the court's jurisdiction to
enforce it. Thus, in Clark v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.,' it was held that
a court which issued an order compelling arbitration retained jurisdiction to later
enforce, vacate, or modify the award.
Of course, the agreement confers jurisdiction only if there is a valid consent
to arbitrate on the part of a party to an agreement. Thus, in Gaslin, Inc. v. L.G.C.
Exports, Inc.," the court held that it was the job of the courts, not arbitrators,
to decide whether the arbitrator has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter to be arbitrated, as well as whether there was an agreement to arbitrate in
the first place. '
Similarly, a state statute may provide a court with subject matter jurisdiction
only if the agreement is subject to the state's code and provides for arbitration in
that state. Thus, in the case of Griffith v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 6 3
the court ruled that a Florida court had no jurisdiction to modify an arbitration
award when the arbitration took place in New York.604 The case resulted from
a motion to modify filed in a Florida state court, but the action was removed to
federal court; the federal court held its jurisdiction was derivative, and since the
state court lacked jurisdiction, it, too, lacked jurisdiction. 605
In Adams v. Nelson,6°6 the North Carolina Supreme Court held the trial
court was not ousted of its jurisdiction because the defendants failed to apply to
the court by proper motion for arbitration. 7 Similarly, in Hendrickson v.
Moghissi,608 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a trial court is not ousted
of jurisdiction by the existence of an agreement to arbitrate; subject matter
jurisdiction could only be removed by constitution or statute.' Thus, although
circuit courts are empowered under the U.A.A. to enforce arbitration agreements,
they are not divested of jurisdiction to hear, inter alia, malpractice claims. 610
The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the defendant
had timely asserted the existence of an arbitration agreement.
611
In Big Beaver Falls Area School District v. Big Beaver Falls Area Education
Association,6"2 it was held that a court does not necessarily lose jurisdiction to
review an arbitrator's award when proper service is not made within the statutory
600. 131 IM. App. 3d 633, 476 N.E.2d 4 (1985).
601. 334 Pa. Super. 132, 482 A.2d 1117 (1984).
602. Id.
603. 611 F. Supp. 1567 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
604. Id. at 1568.
605. Id.
606. 313 N.C. 442, 329 S.E.2d 322 (1985).
607. Id. at 446, 329 S.F.2d at 324.
608. 158 Mich. App. 290, 404 N.W.2d 728 (1987).
609. Id. at 295-96, 404 N.W.2d at 730-31.
610. Id. at 296, 404 N.W.2d at 731.
611. Id. at 299, 404 N.W.2d at 732.
612. 89 Pa. Commw. 176, 492 A.2d 87 (1985).
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period.6. 3 The school district initially made service by mail rather than depu-
tized service as required by the statute.61 '4  However, before the thirty day
statute61 5 had run, the school board petitioned for review as provided for in the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. 61 '6 The appellate court reversed the trial
court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that a reissuance of the petition
was proper where there was no sign that the party seeking review was trying to
stall.61 7
Ordinarily, the U.A.A. does not allow appeals of orders denying motions to
stay arbitration.618 However, the Illinois version of the U.A.A. grants appellate
courts jurisdiction to entertain such appeals. 61 "9
In Paine, Webber, Jackson, and Curtis, Inc. v. Bennett,62 an appeal from
an order denying a motion to compel arbitration was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The appellate court held that because the complaint upon which the
appeal was based had been dismissed with leave to amend, it was not a final order
and thus not appealable.621
However, in Ripple v. Packard,62 2 an appellate court in the same state
(Florida) ruled that such courts have jurisdiction to review otherwise non-
appealable interlocutory orders when those orders depart from the requirements of
law.6' The trial court in that case had granted a motion to vacate an arbitrator's
award without ordering a rehearing before the arbitrator.624
Although arbitrability of individual claims is normally a determination for a
court, in limited instances this responsibility may be shifted to a state administra-
tive agency or board.62  In Board of Education for Dorchester Co. v. Hub-
bard,626 an appellate court in Maryland ruled that the State Board of Education,
rather than the circuit court, had primary jurisdiction over determining the
arbitrability of claims concerning teaching certificate classification and class
size.627 In Hubbard, two disputes were involved. The first involved a group of
Dorchester County teachers who objected to reductions in their teaching certificate
classifications. The second involved a grievance filed by a group of Garrett
County teachers who objected to their school board's failure to hire enough
613. Id.
614. Id. at _, 422 A.2d at 88.
615. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7314(b) (1982).
616. Big Beaver Falls, 89 Pa. Commw. at _, 492 A.2d at 89.
617. Id. at _, 492 A.2d at 90.
618. U.A.A. § 19.
619. Grane v. Grane, 130 IH. App. 3d 332, 335-39, 473 N.E.2d 1366, 1368-71 (1985).
620. 469 So. 2d 881 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
621. Id.
622. 471 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
623. Id. at 1294.
624. Id.
625. Board of Educ. for Dorchester County v. Hubbard, 305 Md. 774, 506 A.2d 625 (1986).
626. Id.
627. Id. at 792, 506 A.2d at 634.
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teachers to accommodate class size. Both groups of teachers sought arbitration.
The Dorchester County School Board sought to stay arbitration, and the Garrett
County School Board sought to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the
issues involved were not arbitrable. Both circuit courts found that the issues were
arbitrable and ruled in favor of the respective teachers.6 2' On appeal, the cases
were consolidated, and the appellate court raised sua sponte the issue of whether
the courts should defer to the State Board of Education.629 Although the court
held that the circuit courts were authorized to entertain the actions, 63 0 it ultimate-
ly found that the State Board of Education had primary jurisdiction.631 The
court justified judicial deference by recognizing that the Board's "paramount role




In Karbowski v. Bradgate Associates,633 the appellate court held that the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to vacate an arbitration award.
Noting that the Massachusetts U.A.A. did not define "court", the appellate court
looked to another section of the statute634 which specified that the proper
jurisdiction to file the initial application to vacate was the superior court.635
In Board of Education v. Illinois Education Labor Relations Board,636 the
court ruled that the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction to
render an arbitration award in response to a labor grievance under the U.A.A..637
In Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority v. Boston Carmen's Union, Division
589,6 a8 the court noted that courts may have jurisdiction to decide disputes when
arbitration would be contrary to public policy.639 However, in that case, it found
no such conflict.'
In Rustad v. Rustad,641 the court held that once it acquired jurisdiction over
a divorce case, no subsequent agreement to arbitrate disputes involved in the
divorce could divest it of jurisdiction. 2
628. Id. at 781-85, 506 A.2d at 628-30.
629. Id. at 785-87, 506 A.2d at 630-31.
630. Id at 787, 506 A.2d at 631.
631. Id.
632. Id. at 791, 506 A.2d at 633. Note that while the court vested primary jurisdiction in the
Board rather than itself, a body independent from the arbitration proceeding was given the power to
determine arbitrability.
633. 25 Mass. App. Ct. 526, 520 N.E.2d 504 (1988).
634. MAss. GEN. L ch. 251, § 17 (1960).
635. Karbowski 25 Mass. App. Ct. at __, 520 N.E.2d at 506.
636. 170 III. App. 3d 490, 524 N.E.2d 711 (1988), appeal denied, 122 II. 2d 569, 530 N.E.2d
239.
637. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10, 91 101-23 (1983).
638. 17 Mass. App. Ct. 104, 455 N.E.2d 1231 (1983).
639. Id. at __, 455 N.E.2d at 1234.
640. Id. at __, 455 N.E.2d at 1235.
641. 68 N.C. App. 58, 314 S.E.2d 275 (1984).
642. Id. at 60-62, 314 S.E.2d at 277-78.
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B. Standing
In Svoboda v. Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabili-
ties," ' the court held that discharged employees had standing to challenge an
arbitrator's award issued after the union challenged the discharge, regardless of
whether the employees alleged or proved that the union did not adequately
represent them in arbitration proceedings." In that case, company rules allowed
an individual employee to bring a grievance on his own without the aid of his
union.6 5 The court held that the word "parties" in the Illinois Public Relations
Act, 6 " which limited actions seeking to vacate an arbitrator's award to "parties"
to a collective bargaining agreement, 6 7 included not only unions and employers,
but individual employees. 6" The Svoboda court further held that although the
collective bargaining agreement provided that "the decision and award of
arbitration shall be final and binding," the Illinois Public Relations Act (which is
subject to the Illinois U.A.A.) does not preclude standing to petition to vacate an
arbitration award.f49
In Eisen v. Minnesota,65 ° the court held that since the U.A.A. does not
define the word "party", it should look to the collective bargaining agreement for
a definition. In that case, only the union was deemed to be a party; thus, the
complaint was dismissed since the complainant (an *aggrieved employee) was not
a party with standing to challenge the arbitrator's decision.
C. Procedural Matters
Challenges to an arbitrator's jurisdiction must be made within the statutory
period, 65' as must challenges to the award itself.652 Timeliness is considered
a jurisdictional matter.653 In Massachusetts, the initial application to vacate an
award must be filed with the superior court, not the district court or any other
court.654
643. 162 Ill. App. 3d 366, 515 N.E2d 446 (1987).
644. Id. at 369, 515 N.E.2d at 449.
645. Id. at 369, 515 N.F_.2d at 448 (construing ILL- REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1 1616 (1985)).
646. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 48, V1 1601-27 (1984).
647. Id., 1 1616.
648. Svoboda, 162 IlL. App. 3d at 367, 515 N.E.2d at 447 (construing ILL REv. STAT. ch. 48,
1606(b) (1985)).
649. Id. at 372, 515 N.E.2d at 450 (construing ILL REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1 1608, 1616 (1985)).
650. 352 N.W.2d 731 (Minn. 1984).
651. Burt v. Duval County School Bd., 481 So. 2d 55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). See also supra
Section IX., Timeliness.
652. Beriker v. Permagrain Products, Inc., 347 Pa. Super. 102, 104, 500 A.2d 178, 179 (1985).
See also supra Section IX., Timeliness.
653. Lough v. Spring, 383 Pa. Super. 85, 91-92, 556 A.2d 441, 444 (1989).
654. See Karbowski v. Bradgate Assocs., 25 Mass. App. Ct. 526, 520 N.E.2d 504 (1988); supra
notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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D. Venue
Arbitrations which are not subject to the state's code or which take place
outside that state may not be challengeable in that state's court.653
XIII. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Because arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution technique favored by
the courts656 and chosen by the parties for its informal, expeditious, and
inexpensive character,65 7 the courts have exercised judicial restraint658 in
reviewing arbitration proceedings. Courts, recognizing that the parties have chosen
by mutual agreement both the forum and the issues to be arbitrated,659 are
reluctant to interfere. Because the parties have expressly chosen arbitration over
judicial proceedings, legislatures and the courts accord great deference to the
finality of its results' and encourage enforcement of arbitration decisions."
Since the advantages of arbitration exist only when the courts view arbitration
as the end rather than the beginning of litigation,6 2 the preeminent value is
finality. The courts manifest this value by imposing strict procedural require-
ments' 3 and a heightened standard of review on challenges to arbitration.
6
"
Thus, there is a "presumption of validity" accorded to arbitration decisions.
661
It should be noted, however, that while this strict review standard applies to the
655. See Griffith v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 1567 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
656. See, e.g., Snyder v. Berliner Const. Co., Inc., 79 Md. App. 29, 33, 555 A.2d 523, 525 (1989)
(noting that under the Maryland U.A.A., "[S]uits to compel arbitration and suits to stay court action
pending arbitration are now to be viewed as 'favored' actions." (quoting Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc.
v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md. App. 307, 320 A.2d 558 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 274
Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975)).
657. Schmidt v. Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 870, 873 (Minn. 1988).
658. Helmrichs v. Bank of Minneapolis & Trust Co., 349 N.W.2d 326, 327 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984).
659. Schmidt, 426 N.W.2d at 873.
660. Melton v. Lyon, 108 N.M. 420, 773 P.2d 732 (N.M. 1989) (finality cannot be upset except
under exceptional circumstances-possible bias of arbitration who formerly worked for competitor of
a party insufficient under facts of case).
661. Barclay Townhouse Ass'n v. Messersmith, 67 Md. App. 493, 508 A.2d 507 (1986); Snyder,
79 Md. App. at 35, 555 A.2d at 525.
662. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George's County v. Prince George's County Educators' Ass'n, Inc.,
309 Md. 85, 98, 522 A.2d 931, 932 (1987).
663. Lough v. Spring, 383 Pa. Super. 85, 556 A.2d 441 (1989) (failure to comply with strict
procedural requirements). But see McGonigle v. Currence, 387 Pa. Super. 511, 564 A.2d 508 (1989)
(failure to appear at arbitration hearing not held to constitute waiver of right to appeal de novo from
award).
664. Barclay, 67 Md. App. at 496, 508 A.2d at 509.
665. Matter of Wyoming Game and Fish Comm'n, 773 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1989).
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trial court's review of the arbitrator, it does not apply to the appellate court's
review of the trial court.66
The scope of review of the arbitration is normally limited to express statutory
grounds defined in the U.A.A..6 7 In some instances and jurisdictions, however,
the scope may be determined by another source. For example, the document
which served as the source of the arbitration,"'  another statute,6 9 or the
common law670 may be the preferred source.
In Pennsylvania (and Maryland), there is a statutory presumption that use of
the U.A.A. in establishing the scope of review is not intended unless explicitly
included in the arbitration agreement. 67' Non-U.A.A. arbitrations in Pennsylva-
nia (e.g., those governed by "Act 111" involving public employees, 6 2 the
common law, 673 or a collective bargaining agreement) are subject to review
under a "narrow certiorari" standard which does not include errors of law or
fact.674 However, arbitrations provided for in agreements prior to enactment of
the Pennsylvania U.A.A. (i.e., under the Pennsylvania Arbitration Act of
1927)675 are subject to a "contrary to law" standard that is the equivalent of a
holding that the ruling, if it was a jury verdict, would justify a judge's entry of a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.676
Maryland also possesses a statutory presumption that use of the U.A.A. is not
intended unless explicitly included in the agreement.677 However, under
666. See, e.g., Michael-Curry Cos. v. Knutson Shareholders Liquidating Trust, 449 N.W.2d 139
(Minn. 1989).
667. See Jackson Trak Group v. Mid States Port Auth., 242 Kan. 683, 751 P.2d 122, 127 (1988).
See also Cady v. Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Idaho 667, 747 P.2d 76 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (review of
arbitrator's decision limited to IDAHO CODE § 7-912 (1986)). See also Boulder City v. General Sales
Drivers, 101 Nev. 117, 118-19, 694 P.2d 498, 500 (1985).
668. See Jackson Trak Group, 242 Kan. at 694, 751 P.2d at 127.
669. E.g., statutes governing public employees such as Pennsylvania's "Act 111". City of
Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5, 565 A.2d 1232 (Pa. Commmw. 1989).
670. Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1619 v. Prince George's County, 74 Md. App. 438, 538
A.2d 329 (1988) (common law is used unless the collective bargaining agreement specifies U.A.A.).
671. Popskyj v. Keystone Ins. Co., _ Pa. Super. _, 565 A.2d 1184 (1989); Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters, 64 Md. App. at _, 538 A.2d at 331. See MD. CrS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-
206(b) (1984 Repl. Vol.).
672. Fraternal Order of Police, 565 A.2d at 1234 (discussing 43 PA. CONS. STAT. §§217.1
through 217.10 (1982) ("Act 111")).
673. Pennsylvania and Maryland create a presumption that the common law shall govern the issue
unless the agreement expressly provides for statutory review. See Derry Township Mun. Auth. v.
Solomon & Davis, Inc., 372 Pa. Super. 213, 539 A.2d 405 (1988); Messersmith, Inc. v. Barclay
Townhouse Assocs., 313 Md. 652, 659 n.2, 547 A.2d 1048, 1051 n.2 (Md. Ct. App. 1988); Int'l Ass'n
of Firefighters, 538 A.2d at 331.
674. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, 565 A.2d at 1234. This Pennsylvania standard has been
handed down by its Supreme Court.
675. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § § 7301-7362, 7302(d)(2)(1982); Geisler, 556 A.2d at 392-93.
676. Geisler v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 556 A.2d 391, 393 (Pa. Super. 1989) (citing historical
note to § 7302(dX2)); Winters v. Erie Ins. Group, 367 Pa. Super. 253, 532 A.2d 885 (1987).
677. See Messersmith, 547 A.2d at 1051 n.2. See also Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 538 A.2d at
331; MD. CrS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-206(b) (1984 Repl. Vol.).
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Maryland common law, "an award is subject to being vacated for a 'palpable
mistake of law or fact ... apparent on the face of the award' or for a 'mistake so
gross as to work manifest injustice.' 6 78
Generally, then, the presumption of validity can only be overcome by a
showing that an express provision for vacating an award under the U.A.A. is
present 679 or that the arbitrator exceeded her power.680 Mistakes of law or fact
are not grounds to second-guess the arbitrator;"' review of such questions is not
de novo,6 2 and problems are the "misfortune of the party"6 3 which elected the
arbitration forum.P4 Nor may a party collaterally attack an arbitrator's decision
if it ignores the arbitration act and does not file a motion to vacate.685
In the absence of a statutorily-based scope of review, the Nevada Supreme
Court ruled in New Shy Clown Casino, Inc. v. Baldwin' that the district court
was without power to rule that one party to an arbitration was the "successful
party" and thus entitled to attorney's fees, when the arbitrator had ordered fees
678. Id. (quoting.Prince George's County Educators'Ass'n, Inc., 309 Md. at 105, 522 A.2d at
940).
679. The following grounds, from the Kansas U.A.A. are typical:
1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any
of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown
therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted
the hearing, contrary to the provisions of K.S.A. 5-405 [U.A.A. hearing provision], as to
prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in
proceedings under K.S.A. 5-402 [U.A.A. Proceedings to compel or stay arbitration] and
the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection;
But the fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court
of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.
KAN. STAT. ANN., 5-412(aX1987).
680. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. 1985, ch. 10, 1 112(aX3) (1989). Kilianek v. Kim, 192 111. App.
3d 139, 548 N.F_.2d 598 (1989).
681. In re Marriage of Gavend, 781 P.2d 161 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
682. Jackson Trak Group, 751 P.2d at 127; Cady, 747 P.2d at 79 (trial de novo would defeat
purpose of U.A.A.); Lorenzini v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 753 S.W.2d 106, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(arbitrator's erroneous interpretation of contract does not violate his power or authority under Mo. REV.
STAT. § 435.405.1 (1986)).
683. Cameron and Griffith, 91 N.C. App. 164, 165, 370 S.E.2d 704, 705 (1988) (improper
interpretation of statute of limitations).
684. Id.
685. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. v. McDaniel, 342 Pa. Super. 557,493 A.2d 731 (1985) (party
moved instead for declaratory judgment).
686. 737 P.2d 525 (Nev. 1987).
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split notwithstanding provision in the statute providing that fees were to be
awarded to the "successful party" in arbitration proceedings.
There are exceptions to the rule that even mistakes of law are not grounds
for a challenge. Pennsylvania's version of the U.A.A. provides that an arbitrator's
holding may be reversed if it is contrary to law.688 (This explains the dispropor-
tionate number of cases reported from Pennsylvania!)
The Michigan Supreme Court held in Renny v. Port Huron Hospital"9 that
a court may find, as a matter of law, that an arbitration proceeding 69 "did not
comport with elementary [procedural] fairness"691 and thus send the issue of
whether an employee was fired for just cause 92 to a jury.693
687. Parties seeking refund of a security deposit were awarded $137,000 of the approximately
$220,000 they sought. The arbitrator then ordered each party to be responsible for their own attorney's
fees, concluding that neither party was completely successful. Id. at 525. The district court had found
the plaintiff to be the "successful party" and awarded it attorney's fees.
688. See Pa. U.A.A. of 1980, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7302(dX2X1982):
Where this paragraph is applicable a court in reviewing an arbitration award pursuant to this
subchapter shall notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, modify or correct the award
where the award is contrary to law and is such that had it been a verdict of a jury the court would have
entered a different judgment or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
lId (quoted in Popskyj, 565 A.2d at 1186).
689. 427 Mich. __, 398 N.W.2d 327 (Mich. 1986).
690. The proceeding involved was unilaterally established by the employer and consisted of a joint
employer-employee grievance board which the court distinguished from arbitration. Id. at , 398
N.W.2d at 336-38. "However, this Court recently agreed with the United States Supreme Court that
a decision of a joint employer-employee grievance committee should be granted the same deference
as that afforded an independent arbiter." Id. at 337 (citing Fulgham v. United Parcel Service, 424
Mich. 89, 378 N.W.2d 472 (1985)).
691. The court found the following essential elements necessary to fair adjudication in
administrative and arbitration proceedings:
1) Adequate notice to persons who are to be bound by the adjudication;
2) The right to present evidence and arguments and the fair opportunity to rebut evidence
and argument by the opposing argument;
3) A formulation of issues of law and fact in terms of the application of rules with respect
to specified parties concerning a specific transaction, situation, or status;
4) A rule specifying the point in the proceeding when a final decision is rendered; and
5) Other procedural elements as may be necessary to ensure a means to determine the
matter in question. These will be determined by the complexity of the matter in question,
the urgency with which the matter must be resolved and the opportunity of the parties to
obtain evidence and formulate legal contentions.
Renny, 427 Mich. at _, 398 N.W.2d at 338 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS, §§ 83(2)
and 84(3)(b)).
The court found that the plaintiff received inadequate notice of the charges and witnesses against
her, as well as of the specific procedures used in both her grievance and subsequent court case. It also
found she was denied the opportunity to present evidence and witnesses and the right to be present
during the hearing. Id at _, 398 N.W.2d at 338-39.
692. The court found that the existence of the grievance procedure implied that a "just cause"
contract was involved, contrary to the employer's assertion that power was reserved to terminate an
employee "at will." Id. at _, 398 N.W.2d at 336.
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Some courts in Maryland have held that a construction of the underlying
contract that is "completely irrational" 694 is beyond the scope of the arbitrator's
powers and constitutes grounds for judicial reversal. 95
Even when statutory grounds are alleged for judicial intervention, they are
usually construed strictly. Timeliness requirements are strictly enforced.696
Complaints must be detailed and convincing. Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held in Michael-Curry v. Knutson697 that accusations of fraud must be stated
with particularity. 69  The court in Foster v. Turley6' required "clear and
convincing evidence" of fraud before intervening.7°°
On the question of whether the arbitrator has exceeded her powers, the courts
have applied varying tests. One court required "objective evidence of impropriety
in the record" and concluded that the test was not met.7° ' Other courts have
looked for "clear and convincing evidence."
70 2
In general, however, it is not enough that the arbitrator's decision is not what
a court of law or equity would have done.703 This is true even on issues as
sensitive as the statute of limitations7" or the exclusion of evidence.0 5
693. The court noted that had the proceeding been procedurally fair, it would have been subject
to only limited judicial review-i.e., to the statutory grounds for vacating an award, citing M.C.R. 3-
602(J). Renny, 427 Mich. at _, 398 N.W.2d at 335-37. The court finds the basis for the
"procedurally unfair" rule in federal labor law, citing Breish v. Ring Screw Works, 248 N.W.2d 526
(Mich. 1976), but says explicitly the same applies to arbitration proceedings. Renny, 427 Mich. at ,
398 N.W.2d at 338.
694. Snyder v. Berliner Const. Co., Inc., 79 Md. App. 29, 36, 555 A.2d 523, 526 (1989).
695. Id.; O-S Corp. v. Kroll, 348 A.2d 830 (Md. App. 1975). For a case in which the standard
was met on a question of fact, see Bd. of Educ. of Prince George's County v. Prince George's County
Educators' Ass'n, Inc., 309 Md. 85, 522 A.2d 93 (1987). Snyder, 79 Md. at 38 n.2, 555 A.2d at 527
n.2, notes however, that because Maryland's high court has not reached the issue, it is not clear that
this is good law in Maryland. In fact, the doctrine was called into question in Messersmith, Inc. v.
Barclay Townhouse Assocs., 313 Md. 652, 660 n.2, 547 A.2d 1048, 1051 n.2 (Md. Ct. App. 1988).
The Snyder holding rested on other grounds as well, i.e., the arbitrator exceeding his power and a
possible mistake of law regarding jurisdiction. Snyder, 79 Md. App at 29, 555 A.2d at 523.
696. Off v. Off, 108 Idaho 874,876,702 P.2d 912,914 Idaho 1985). See also supra, Section IX.,
Timeliness.
697. 449 N.W.2d 139 (1989).
698. Id. at 142.
699. 808 F.2d 38 (10th Cit. 1986).
700. Id. at 42. Foster involved a failure to disclose material facts to the arbitrator.
701. See G.L Wilson Bldg. Co. v. Throneburg Hosiery Co., 85 N.C. App. 684,_, 355 S.E.2d
815, 818 (1987).
702. Burd, Inc. v. Stoneville Furniture Co., 134 II. App. 3d 149, _, 479 N.E.2d 962,965 (1985)
(standard not met).
703. See, e.g., Koranda v. Austin Mut. Ins. Co., 397 N.W.2d 357 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
704. Cameron and Griffith, 91 N.C. App. 164, 165, 370 S.E.2d 704, 705 (1988).
705. Fairbanks Mun. Util. Sys. v. Lees, 705 P.2d 457 (Alaska 1986) (courts should interfere only
when exclusion amounts to complete omission of critical evidence). But see Renny, 427 Mich. 415,
398 N.W.2d 327 (exclusion of witnesses or evidence may be grounds for claim of elementary
unfairness justifying reversal of arbitration result).
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There are, however, issues which the courts will review de novo. These
include issues relating to jurisdiction, including the existence of the agreement,"
the arbitrability of an issue,70 7 and the arbitrator's jurisdiction.7°  The issue
is sometimes couched in terms of "subject matter jurisdiction. 009
The court in Lanci v. Metropolitan Insurance Co. 71 ' held that an issue that
would be unreviewable after the dispute went to arbitration was appealable under
the collateral order doctrine prior to arbitration since the right involved was too
important to be denied review and would be irreparably lost if review was
postponed.71'
Thus, jurisdictional questions can be the hook that courts hang their hat on
when review is deemed appropriate. For example, in Snyder,712 the Maryland
Court of Appeals held that an arbitrator's refusal to consider all claims before him
constituted exceeding his jurisdiction.713 Other courts, however, hold that even
a generalized statement in the decision that all claims have been considered and
rejected is sufficient to withstand review. 14
Another such "hook" for judicial review is a conflict between the decision of
the arbitrator and public policy.7 5 Thus, in Schmidt v. Midwest Family Insur-
ance Co.,7"6 the Minnesota Supreme Court voided a term in an insurance policy
which specified that the insurer was entitled to a trial de novo if an arbitration
award exceeded a specified limit. The court held that the provision was contrary
to the public policy of the state, which favored arbitration.717
In Azpell v. Old Republic Insurance Co., 7' 8 a Pennsylvania court held that
an arbitration award which provided for a recovery in addition to worker's
706. Synder, 79 Md. App. 29, 555 A.2d 523; Kilianek v. Kim, 192 Ill. App. 3d 139, 548 N.E.2d
598 (1989).
707. Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Valdez, 107 N.M. 764, 764 P.2d 1322 (N.M. 1988).
708. Snyder, 79 Md. App. at 40, 555 A.2d at 528.
709. Board of Educ. v. Compton, 157 lU. App. 3d 439, _, 510 N.E.2d 508, 511 (1987).
710. 388 Pa. Super. 1, 564 A.2d 972 (1989).
711. The case involved a trial court's factual determination of a question of whether a settlement
agreement was based on mutual mistake. If appeal was quashed, the case would have proceeded to
an uninsured motorist arbitration hearing. The court held that mutual mistake entitled Lanci to void
the settlement agreement. Id. at 972-75.
712. Snyder, 79 Md. App. at 29, 555 A.2d 523.
713. Id. at 37; 555 A.2d at 527.
714. L.R. Foy Constr. Co. v. Pro. Mechanical Contr., 13 Kan. App. 2d 188, 196, 766 P.2d 196,
202-03 (1988).
715. Schmidt v. Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 870 (Minn. 1988) (trial de novo term
in insurance policy contrary to public policy favoring arbitration); Azpell v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 382
Pa. Super. 255, 555 A.2d 168 (1989) (arbitration award contrary to public policy limiting recovery to
worker's compensation); City of DeKalb v. Local 1236, 182 Ill. App. 3d 367, 538 N.E.2d 867 (1989)
(award was contrary to public policy favoring uniformity of pension benefits for disabled firefighters).
716. Schmidt, 426 N.W.2d 870.
717. Id. at 874-75.
718. AzpelU, 382 Pa. Super. 255, 555 A.2d 168.
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compensation ran contrary to public policy that worker's compensation be the
exclusive means of recovery in such cases.719
In City of DeKalb v. International Association of Firefighters, Local
1236,720 an arbitration award which would have created pension benefits greater
than those of other disabled firefighters in Illinois was voided as contrary to public
policy, which favored uniform pension benefits for all disabled public firefighters."'
Other cases successfully challenging arbitration awards as contrary to public
policy include those involving uninsured motorist coverage. 712
However, in Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1300 v. Mass Transit
Administration,723 a Maryland appeals court overturned a lower court ruling
setting aside an arbitrator's reinstatement of a bus driver dismissed for having
alcohol on his breath. The court found the arbitrator's finding that the driver was
not intoxicated took it out of the realm of Maryland's public policy regarding
driving while intoxicated.
Finally, courts are more willing to vacate a decision if it involves attorney-










719. Id. at _, 555 A.2d at 172-73. It should be noted, however, that Pennsylvania has an
atypical "contrary to law" standard of review in their version of the UAA..
720. 182 Ill. App. 3d 367, 538 N.E.2d 867 (1989).
721. Id. at 372, 538 N.E.2d at 870-73. The court notes that courts may review public policy
issues de novo even when they have been submitted to the arbitrator. Id. at 376, 538 N.E.2d at 873.
722. This rule was established by Davis v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 500 Pa. 84, 454 A.2d 973
(1982). Note again, however, Pennsylvania's atypical "contrary to law' standard of review.
723. Amalgamated Transit Union v. Mass Transit Admin., 305 Md. 380, 504 A.2d 1136 (Md.
1986).
724. Marino v. Tagaris, 395 Mass. 397, 480 N.E.2d 286, 289 (1985).
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